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The highly indebted countries have been removing their trade
barriers but creditor nations are increasing them. This makes it
harder for the indebted countries to export more and to service
their debts.
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In the early 1980s, faced with a mounting debt  Industrial countries' export subsidies have
crisis, most highly indebted developing coun-  contributed to lower prices for beef, sugar, and
tries increased trade barriers to generate more  grains - which are important exports for
foreign exchange - but in the last three to four  several highly indebted countries. Industrial
years, they have reversed course.  countries have also recently imposed stricter
import quotas and pressured highly indebted
Almost all highly indebted countries have  countries to accept additional "voluntary" export
undergone real devaluations and many have  restraints.
undertaken significant liberalizations, so much
so that some countries (Bolivia, Jamaica,  In geneml, hignly indebted countries remain
Uruguay, Mexico, Morocco, Costa Rica) are less  more protectionist than industrial nations.  But
protectionist than before the debt crisis.  growing protectionism in thle  industrial nations
makes it more difficult for highly indebted
But industrial countries have imposed new  countries to pay off their debts, and ultimately
nontariff barriers against imports from highly in-  rebounds on creditor govermments  and banks.
debted countries. Canada, Australia, the EEC,
and the United States have greatly inc'eased the
use of countervailing duties and antidumping
actions.
This paper is a product of the International  Trade Division, Intemational Economics
Departnent.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Salome Torrijos, room S8-033, extension
33709.
TChe  PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the fidings  of work urBder  way in the Bank's Po&cy,  PlTuming,  and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these ftndings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papeTs  do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
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I.  Introduction
This  paper  analyzes  trade  policies  from  the  perspective  of the  debt
problem  of the  highly  indebted  countries  (HICs).  1/  The  importance  of this
topic  is  straightforward.  On the  one  hand,  the  resource  allocation  and
international  competitiveness  of the  HICs  will improve  with the  introduction
of trade  liberalization  measures. On the  other  hand,  trade  liberalization  in
the  creditor  countries  is important  to them,  not  only  from  a welfare  point  of
view,  but  also  because  it increases  the  degree  of access  to  their  markets  by
exports  from  indebted  couri'ries.  If  the  HICs  are  able  to  profit  from  these
trade  opportunities,  their  higher  foreign  exchange  earnings  would  be partly
used  for  debt  service. This in  turn  would  help to  ease  the  problems  of the
debtors  and  also  of the  creditor's  financial  sectors.
Section  II  will  analyze  changes  in the  trade  policy  of the  HICs.
Here  we show  that,  following  the increase  in import  barriers  during  the  early
80s, in  recent  years,  the  HICs  have  liberalized  their  import  regimes  and
conducted  real  devaluations.  In  section  III  we look  at the  behavior  of trade
policies  of the  industrial  (creditor)  countries  (EEC,  Japan  and  the  United
States)  vis-a-vis  the  highly  indebted  countries  and  other  groups  of
countries. This  analysis  includes  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  (NTBs). We
observe  a tendency  of the  industrial  countries  to impose  new  nontariff
barriers,  particularly  antidumping  and countervailing  investigations  and
duties  on imports  coming  from  highly  indebted  countries.
*  The  authors  are indebted  to  Bela  Balassa,  Ron  Duncan,  J.  Michael  Finger-,
Paul  Meo, Richard  Snape  and  Neil  Roger  for  comments  on an earlier  draft.
1/ The  country  coverage  of the  HICs  follows  the  classification  of the  World
Bank (see  for  example,  World  Development  Report,  1988). It includes
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Ecuador,  Jamaica,  Morocco,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Peru,  Philippines,  Uruguay,
Venezuela,  and  Yugoslavia.Section  IV provides  a rough  estimate  of the  foreign  exchange  earnings
foregone  by the  highly  indebted  countries  which  can  be  attributed  in  part to
import  barriers  of industrial  countries. We conservatively  estimate  that  the
removal  of trade  barriers  facing  the  key  exports  of the  HICs  could  lift  their
exports  by at least  $7.2  billion  dollars  a year.  In  addit'on,  industrial
countries'  trade  policies  contributed  Lo the  decline  in  the  prices  of beef,
sugar  and  grains  which  have  an important  weight  in  the  exports  of the  HICs.
These  commodity-price  effects  as well  as the  effects  of several  industrial
countries'  trade  policies  including  antidumping  and  countervailing  actions,
unfair  trade  actions,  recent  import  quotas  and  "voluntary"  export  restraints,
etc.  are  not  reflected  in  our  estimates  of foreign  exchange  gains  to  the  HICs
from  elimination  of industrial  countries'  import  restrictions.
Section  V  will  provide  a brief  assessment  of the  trade  p'r  ormance  of
the  HICs.  There  is  an important  linkage  between  the  changes  in
indebtedness  in  the  1980s  and their  dependence  on exports  and  commo'dlties
which  have  undergone  price  declines  --  some  of  which  are  also  policy  related.
Section  VI  contains  some  final  remarks. Overall,  we conclude  that
the  trade  regimes  of the  HICs  remain  more  protected  than  that  of industrial
countries  and  therefore,  their  trade  and industrial  policies  remain  a greater
impediment  to their  export  performance  than  the  barriers  they  face  in
industrial  markets. Nevertheless,  the  HICs  are facing  .ncreasing  problems  in
trying  to  export  their  goods  because  of trade  barriers  and  support  mechanisms
in  the  major  industrial  markets  countries. Regrettably,  it is  not  widely
understood  that  protection  is  a matter  of tradeoffs:  protection  for  sectors
facing  competition  from  HICs  exports  may  have  an adverse  effect  on the  banking
sector  in  the  industrialized  countries  if the  HICs  are  unable  to  gain
increased  export  revenues  to  meet their  debt  commitments.
II.  Recent  Trends  in the  Trade  Regimes  of Indebted  Countries
When the  HICs  faced  their  payments  problems  during  the  early  80s,
they  all  increased  import  barriers  as a way  of  generating  a foreign  exchange
surplus. This increase  in import  barriers  was  effected  mainly  by introducing
generalized  mechanisms  of import  licensing. Less  well  known  is  that,  since- 3  -
then,  a  najority  of the  HICs  have  introduced  trade  liberalization  measures,
and  in  approximately  half  the  cases  we find  evidence  that  import  regimes  are
today  more  liberal  than  even  before  the  crisis.
A.  Trade  policy  indicators  of the  HICs  during  the  1980s
Table 1  presents  some  key  trade  policy  indicators  of the  HICs. The
major  sor-ce  of information  is  World  Bank  documents,  but in  several  instances
we have  resorted  to  published  research. For  the  interested  reader,  a short
discussion  of the  recent  trade  policy  behavior  of each  HIC  is  available  from
the  authors. Where  information  is  available,  we present  for  each indicator
its  value  before  the  debt  crisis,  when  this  crisis  appeared,  and  a  more recent
reading. 1/
1.  Shift  of import  policies  during  the  debt  crisis
Between  1982  and 1984,  the  debt  crisis  led  the  HICs  to increase
import  barriers  as they  confronted  debt-servicing  difficulties.  In  some
countries  this  behavior  implied  a reversal  of trade  liberalization  attempts
while  in  others,  it  essentially  represented  tightening  of their  price  and
nonprice  import  controls.
At the  time  of the  debt  crisis,  several  countries  --  including
Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Peru,  the  Philippines,  and Uruguay  --  had  either
recently  introduced  or were introducing  trade  liberalization  policies. In  all
of these  countries  the  debt  crisis  led  to  a reversal  of these  policies.  2/
Among  this  set  of countries,  the  most  drastic  reversals  occurred  in  Argentina,
1/  Because  the  methodology  for  constructing  the  trade  policy  indicators
varies,  intercountry  comparisons  cannot  always  be  made.  Although  Table  1
is  on import  policies,  the  discussion  in the  text  includes  comments  on
import  taxes  and  foreign  exchange  controls.
2/  This  does  not imply  that  the  debt  crisis  was  the  only  explanatory  factor
for  the  reversal  of the  liberalization  attempts;  but it  certainly  was  a
major  one.- 4 -
Peru,  and  the  Philippines.  1/  During  the late  70s  and  early  80s  these
countries  dismantled  virtually  all  NTBs  and  replaced  them  by tariff  rates,  all
below  60%. After  this,  Table  1  shows  that  they  reverted  to  discretionary
management  of NTBs including  import  prohibitions  and  licensing.
In  addition  to  countries  that  reversed  ongoing  liberalization
programs,  there  is  a large  group  --  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ecuador,
Jamaica,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Venezuela  and  Yugoslavia  --  that  had
maintained  relatively  protectionist  trade  policies,  including  substantial
NTBs. The  payments  crisis  pushed  these  countries  to  further  increase  and
tighten  direct  controls.
In  short,  none  of the  HICs  relied  exclusively  on devaluation  cum
strong  demand  management  as the  sole  way  of confronting  their  payments
problems;  virtually  all  accompanied  their  devaluation  with  some  form  of import
restriction.  But  the  form  of the  restriction  made  an important  difference.
These  restrictions  can  work  through  the  price  mechanism  or they  may entail
some  form  of direct  control. The social  costs  of import  barriers  are  likely
to be  much  higher  in  the  second  case.
Among  the 17  HICs,  only  three  --  Chile,  Costa  Rica  and  Uruguay  --
resorted  mainly  to import  taxes  in  contrast  to  NTBs  as  a way  of restricting
imports. Chile  and  Costa  Rica  had  been  relying  on tariff  protection  for
several  years  before  the  crisis. When in  the  early  1980s,  after  a period  of a
seriously  overvalued  currency,  Chile  implemented  a real  devaluation,  it  also
increased  its  uniform  tariff  structure  Jn  steps  to 35%,  and initiated  numerous
countervailing  duty investigations  (CVD)  against  imports  from  neighboring
countries. Nevertheless,  according  4o the  GATT  files,  of the 140  CVD
investigations  initiated  during  1981-86,  only  one  has  ended  up  with  a positive
finding  while  the  rest  turned  out  with  a negative  outcome. Since  1984,  when
import  restrictions  peaked,  Chile  reintroduced  trade  liberalization  measures
and  by  December  1987,  the  uniform  tariff  rate  had  declined  to 15%.
1/ The trade  liberalization  experiences  of these  countries  have  been
documented  in  Nogu6s  (1986a)  for  Argentina;  Nogues  (1986b)  for  Peru  and
Shepherd  (1986)  for  the  Philippines.- 5  -
Table  1:  SUMARY OF TRADtE  POLICY INDICATORS  OF HIGHLY INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
BEFORE, OURING  AND AFTER  THE FAYIENTS CRISIS
AVERAGE
TARIFF RATES (5)  INCIDENCE  OF NTBs  (%)  1/
Before  During  After  Before  During  After
Argentina  2/  44(U)  3/  D  Z.,  L  100(tI)  6-  't1)
Bolivia  H  H  20  H  100(M)
Brazil  H  H  51U)  H  100(M)  100(M)
Chile  4/  10  35  1S  0  L  L
Colombia  NA  61(U)  52(U)  <66(M)  66(M)  SO(M)
Costa  Rica  <54(U)  54(U)  24(U)  L  L  2(M)
Cote  dlIvoire  31(W  NA  5/  NA  47(M)  L
Ecuasdor  <51(U)  51(U)  42(U)  NA  29(ti)  16(tl)
Jamaica  NA  NA  D  NA  100(P)  9(P)
Mexico  NA  25(W)  <25(W)  60(M)  100(M)  39(M)
Morocco  NA  36(U)  23(U)  34(tI)  100(tl)  67(tI)
Nigoria  14(R)  19(R)  NA  H  100(ti)  L
Peru  32(U)  57(U)  >57(U)  L  100(M)  100(M)
Philippines  6/  43(U)  D  29(U)  40(tl)  100(tl)  13/  <100(t1)
Uruguay  67(U)  46(U)  D  0  D  L
Venezuela  NA  NA  34(U)  7(tl)  50(ti)  <SOCtl)
Yugoslavia  7/  NA  NA  12(U)  NA  NA  50(M)
Notes  on  symbols  and letters
0:  deciningi)  NA:  not  available;  H:  high;  L:  low;  (U):  unweighted;  (W)  import
weighted;  (W ):  output  weighted;  (M):  loport  coverage;  (P)  product  coverage;  (ti):  tariff
line  coverage;  c:  lower  than;  >:  higher  than;  (R):  tariff  revenues  as  a  proportion  of
Imports:
1/  A  value  of  100 for  the  NTB coverage  Is  valid  for  all  three  Indicators  tl,  M and P.
2/  The  recent  estimate  of Incidence  of  NTBs  does not  IncIude  the  liberal  ization  of  the  steel
and  petrochemical  Industries  lmplemented  In  early  1988.
3/  Estimated  from  table  7  In  Nogu6s  (1986).
4/  Only  a few  variable  levies  protecting  cereals,  sugar  and dairy  products  remain  In  place.
5/  Because the  dismantling  of NTBs will  be  accompanied  by  the  Introduction  of  tariff
surcharges,  It  Is  expected  that  the  maximum  and  average  tariff  rates  will  be Increasing.
6/  Direct  foreign  exchange  allocation  was  the  main  NTB Introduced  at  the  time  of  the  debt
crises.
7/  There  Is  also  a generalized  tariff  surcharge  that  up  to  1987 was 7S;  since  then  It  has  been
ralsed  to  10%.Costa  Rica  applied  escalated  tariff  surcharges  and  consumption  taxes
while  Uruguay  introduced  a uniform  tariff  surcharge. In  recent  years,  these
countries  have  also been  eliminating  these  measures.
Except  for  these  three  cases,  the  other  HICs  resorted  to import
licensing  as a way  of restricting  imports.  Table 1  shows  that  at a point  in
time,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Pero,  and
the  Philippines  introduced  direct  controls  on  all imports. In  some  of these
cases,  e.g.,  Brazil  and  the  Philip,.ines,  foreign  exchange  controls  played  a
predominant  role (Moreira  and  Araujo  1984  for  Brazil  and  Shepherd  1986  for  the
Philippines).  Colombia,  Ecuador  and  Venezuela  greatly  increased  the
proportion  of imports  covered  by import-licensing  mechanisms. In  addition  to
direct  import  controls  some  of these  countries  also increased  import  taxes.
For  example,  in  Argentina,  a uniform  tariff  surcharge  was  introduced  with  the
launching  of the  Austral  plan  in  mid-1985. Nigeria,  Peru  and  Yugoslavia  also
increased  their  tariff  structures.
2.  From import-restricting  to  import-liberalizing  trade  policies
During  the  last  few  years,  an important  number  of  HICs  have  been
implementing  liberalization  measures. In  some  cases,  the  measures  have  been
so ambitious  that  their  import  regimes  are  now  more  open  than  before  the  debt
crisis. In  other  cases,  the  recent  trade  liberalization  measures  have  been
milder,  but  still  imply  a partial  dismantling  of the  protection  introduced
when  the  payment  problems  started.
Quite  unexpectedly,  six  HICs  are  today  according  to  our indicators
more  open than  what  they  used  to be  before  the  payments  crisis. These  are
Bolivia,  Jamaica,  Uruguay,  Mexico,  Morocco  and  Costa  Rica. Some  of these
countries  have implemented  a  mjfor  liberalization  of  NTBs  and  have  also
reduced  tariff  rates. Bolivia  with  a 20%  uniform  tariff  rate  and  a floating
foreign  exchange  rate (determined  through  an auction  system),  is  a remarkable
example  of a major  trade  liberalization.  This  liberalization  has  included  the
abandonment  of an extensive  system  of direct  import  controls. Together  with
Chile,  Bolivia  is  now  the  most  open  economy  among  the  sample  of HICs. Bolivia
seems  to implement  a  uniform  tariff  rate  of 10  percent  by 1990.-7-
Jamaica,  too,  has introduced  significant  liberalization  measures,
although  not  as extensive  as Bolivia's.  On the  other  hand,  except  for  a short
period  of time,  Uruguay  has  continued  introducing  liberalization  measures
(Favaro  and  Spiller,  1986).
Mexico  and  Morocco  have  recently  acceded  to the  GATT.  1/  As a
consequence,  major  elements  of their  recent  and  ambitious  trade  liberalization
measures  ircluding  their  maximum  tariff  rates  of around  50%  are  bound.
Nevertheless,  while  Morocco  has  recently  increased  its  special  import  tariff,
Mexico  has  continued  its  liberalization  program. By December  1987,  it  had
dismantled  its  mechanism  of reference  prices  and  the  maximum  de facto  tariff
rate  was  20%.  Nevertheless,  in  both  countries,  the  remaining  NTBs  still
protect  major  segments  of domestic  production.
On the  other  hand,  because  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Nigeria  have implemented
a  major  dismantling  of  NTBs,  they  are  also  likely  to be  more  open  now  than
what  they  were  before  the  payments  crises. Including  these  countries,  the
number  of HICs that  today  have import  regimes  more  open  than  before  the  debt
crisis  increases  to eight.
Thus,  in  spite  of payments  problems  and  powerful  domestic  resistance
to i beralization,  more  than  half  the  HICs  have  introduced  more  transparent,
and  in some  cases  --  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Mexico  and  Uruguay  --  trade  policies
which  by historical  standards  are  very  opetn.  This is  remarkable;  only  a few
years  ago few  would  have  expected  such  significant  policy  changes  could  be
introduced.
Although  six  other  HICs  --  Argentina,  Chile,  Colombia,  Ecuador,
Philippines  and  Venezuela  --  have  introduced  some  trade  liberalization
measures,  their  import  regimes  remain  more  closed  than  before  the  payments
crisis. In  spite  of this  common  characteristic,  there  are important
differences  among  these  countries. For  example,  in  relation  to the  pre-crisis
period,  Chile's  uniform  import  tariff  remains  higher,  but  it is  still  one  of
the  two  most  open  economies  among  the  HICs.  In  contrast,  practically  no
1/ Those  HICs  which  are  not  signatories  to the  GATT  include  Bolivia,  Ecuador
anid  Venezuela. Costa  Rica  is in  the  process  of  accession.-8-
import  liberalization  hds  been  introduced  in  Venezuela  and  Ecuador. Never-
theless,  Ecuador  has  devalued  and  adopt'ed  a managed  floatlng  exchange  rate
regime,  easing  the  pressures  on the  import  control  system. Somewhere  in
between  these  cases  is  Argentina,  which  has  been  dismantling  high  export  taxes
and today,  the  few  that  remain  carry  low  rates. On the  import  side,  the
liberalization  of the  steel  and  petrochemical  industries  in  early  1988  has
also  been  a significant  liberalization  measure.
Two countries,  Brazil  and  Yugoslavia,  have  not  made  any  significant
changes  in  their  inward-looking  policies  during  the 1980s  (see  Araujo  and
Moreira,  1984  and  Havrylyshyn,  1986). Finally,  Peru  remains  at least  as
protected  a, when the  import  controls  were  reintroduced  during  1985.
In summary,  the  two  polar  cases  of trade-policy  behavior  in  recent
post-crisis  years  are  Bolivia  and  Peru. Bolivia's  may  be the  fastest  and  most
ambitious  trade  liberalization  policy  that  has  been  introduced  in  the  post-
WWII  era.  In  contrast,  during  1984-85,  Peru  drastically  reversed  the  trade
liberalization  policies  introduced  during  the  late 1970s  and  early  1980s;
together  with  Brazil  and  Yugoslavia  it remains  one  of the  three  most  inward-
oriented  economies  among  the  HICs.
Although  the  other  HICs  fall  in  between  these  two  extremes,  in  an
important  number,  the  policy  trend  is  closer  to that  of Bolivia. This,  as
said,  is the  case  of Costa  Rica,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Uruguay  and  very
likely  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Nigeria. A second  set  of countries  --  Argentina,
Chile,  Columbia,  Ecuador,  the  Philippines  and  Venezuela  --  that  also  raised
import  barriers  during  the  payment  crisis  have introduced  some  trade
liberalization  measures. A third  set  of countries  are  Brazil  and  Yugoslavia,
that  have  consistently  maintained  protectionist  import  regimes. Finally  as
said,  the  worst  case  in  terms  of trade  policy  shifts  is  Peru.
B.  Real  exchange  rate  behavior
Theory  suggests  and  experience  shows  that  successful  trade  liberali-
zation  policies  have  been  accompanied  by a real  devaluation.  Table  2 shows
the  behavior  of the  real  exchange  rate (RER)  of the  HICs  between  1980  and-9-
'able  2:  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATES  OF 15  HIGHLY  INOEaTED  COUNTRIES
RATIO  OF 1986
RATE  TO  THE
HIGHEST  RATE
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  IN  1980s
7gentina  54  77  100  91  51  43  50  44  44  0.44
::Ivia  e8  92  100  127  136  125  172  256  82  0.32
razil  123  112  100  122  128  104  104  100  94  0.73
Chile  85  86  100  118  106  87  85  69  58  0.49
Colombia  95  98  100  108  115  114  104  91  63  0.59
Costa  Rica  87  91  100  63  72  83  82  81  72  0.72
Cote  dlIvolre  89  98  100  85  78  75  72  72  85  0.85
Ecuador  99  99  100  112  110  104  86  89  72  0.64
Jamaica  96  90  100  106  111  104  73  64  68  0.62
1exico  84  89  iOO  ii4  81  72  84  K6  60  0.53
'rocco  103  103  100  92  90  84  79  74  71  0.71
JIgeria  91  93  100  111  114  135  185  167  88  0.48
Peru  88  90  100  119  122  115  115  94  106  0.87
Philippines  88  95  100  103  108  90  89  98  76  0.71
Uruguay  72  79  100  112  118  72  69  67  66  0.56
Venezuela  91  92  100  112  120  110  93  90  77  0.64
Yugoslavia  103  109  100  105  98  76  74  71  76  0.72
Source: World  Bank  BESO  Data  Base- 10  -
1986.  1/ The  last  colunm  indicates  the  ratio  of the 1986  RER  to the  highest
RER  observed  during  the  1980s.
The  figures  show  several  interesting  aspects. First,  in  recent
years,  all (RERs)  have  declined,  signifying  a real  depreciation.  The  greatest
depreciation  is  recorded  for  Argentina,  Chile  and  Mexico. During  the  early
19&3s,  all  of these  countries  had  undergone  a process  of significant  real
appreciation.
There  is  also  a group  cf HICs  --  including  Brazil,  Cote  d'Ivoire
(which  belongs  to  the  franc  zone),  Nigeiia  and  Perui  --  showing  a relatively
low  real  depreciation.  It is  of interest  to recall  that  the  import  regimes  of
Brazil  and  Peru  remain  highly  protectionistic.  2/
In  addition  to the  real  devaluation  process,  there  are  some  shifts  in
exzhange  rate  regimes  that  are  worth  emphasizing.  Here  again  a contrasting
behavior  is  observed  in the  neighboring  countries  of Bolivia  and  Peru. We
already  mentioned  that  when import  barriers  were  reduced,  Bolivia  dismantled
its  exchange  controls  and introduced  an auction  system  for  allocating  foreign
exchange  reserves. As  a consequence,  the  black  market  rate  which  used  to be
15  times  higher  than  the  official  rate,  practically  disappeared  (Morales  and
Sachs,  1987). In  contrast,  Peru increased  its  tariff  rates,  extended  direct
controls  over 100%  of imports,  and  created  an escalated  structure  of
commercial  exchange  rates. At a point  in  time  the  maximum  commercial  exchange
rate  was  more  than  four  times  higher  than  the  minimum.
Other  countries  that  in  rec  nt years  have  liberalized  their  foreign
exchange  regimes  include  Chile,  Columbia,  Ecuador  (floating  regime),  Jamaica
(auction  regime)  Nigeria  (auction  regime),  and  Uruguay.
1/  This  is  a weighted  RER  where  the  weights  are  given  by the  value  of trade
with  the  main  trading  partners. The RER  is  defined  by the  inverse  of the
nominal  exchange  rate  times  the  ratio  of the  wholesale  price  index  of the
trading  partner  to the  dome'..  ic  wholesale  price  index.
2/  On the  other  hand,  Brazil  is  one  of the  few  HICs  that  has  avoided  quite
consistency  episodes  of  severe  ciurrency  overvaluation.- 11 -
In  contrast,  few  countries  that  have  maintained  relatively  closed
import  regimes  have  also  kept important  controls  over  their  exchange  rates,
including  multiple  exchange  rate  regimes. In some  cases  --  such  as Argentina,
Brazil,  Philippines,  Venezuela  and  Yugoslavia  --  important  differentials
between  the  commercial  and  parallel  or financial  market  exchange  rates  are
recorded.
C.  Concluding  note  on the  HICs  trade  and  exchange  rate  policies
During  the  debt  crisis,  the  trade  policies  introduced  as partial
response  to the  high  debt-service  payments  implied  that  in  some  cases
ambitious  programs  of trade  liberalization  were  reversed. In  most  cases,  the
NTBs  introduced  to  cope  with  the  payments  crisis  wrecked  the  trade  regimes  of
a majority  of HICs  pushing  them  to  reintroduce  and/or  reinforce  obscure  and
administratively  discretionary  trade  policies.
Although  in the  short  run  these  policies  increased  the  foreign
exchange  reserves  of the  HICs,  they  worsened  their  long-run  growth  and
employment  prospects. What  was  done  to trade  policies  for  debt-service
purposes,  was  the  exact  opposite  of what  should  have  been  done.  If creditors
wanted  to increase  the  likelihood  of getting  their  money  back  and  debtors  the
likelihood  of repaying,  they  should  have  gone  for  an improvement  in  the
resource  allocation  of the  debtor  and  as  we shall  see  also  of the  creditor
countries. As is  usual  with  crisis,  the  debt  problems  were  addressed
initially  with  wrong  policies. However,  since  the  debt  crisis  peaked,  the
trade  and  exchange  rate  policy  behavior  of  most  HICs  has  clearly  been  in  the
direction  of liberalization;  in  some  cases  this  liberalization  has  been
remarkable.
Many  of these  trade  liberalization  experiences  have  been implemented
in  countries  that  have  followed  import-substitution  policies  for  decades.
These  new  policies  have  been  fiercely  attacked  by powerful  and  concentrated
groups  of protected  entrepreneurs  and  a linked  bureaucracy.  Yet,  in spite  of
this  opposition,  these  reforms  have  been implemented  amidst  serious  payments
problems. Although  much  remains  to  be done,  this  is  from  an historical
perspective  a remarkable  policy  behavior.- 12  -
In most cases,  these  policies  need  to be reinforced  over time;  a
reversal  would  entail  tremendous  social  costs. The  sustainability  of these
liberalization  episodes  depends  on a  number  of factors  which  is  not the
purpose  of this  article  to  discuss. On the  external  front,  however,  the
likelihood  of sustainability  will  partly  depend  on the  degree  of access  that
industrial  countries  provide  to  the  exports  of other  countries,  including  the
HICs. The  next  section  will  address  this  issue.
III. Trade  Policies  of the  Industrial  Countries  in  the 1980s
A.  Tariffs  and  hard-core  NTBs
Overall,  nominal  tariff  protection  in the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  United
States  is  quite  moderate  --  see  Annex  Table  1  --  with  the  HICs  having  a slight
advantage  over  industrialized  countries  because  of tariff  preferences.
However,  even  with  tariff  preferences,  there  are  numerous  categories  of
products  where  the  trade-weighted  average  for  the  sector  is  higher  for  the
HICS  than  for  the  industrial  countries.  The  most  striking  example  of this  is
in the  clothing  sector  where  the  average  tariff  rates  against  the  HICS  are
9.3%  in  the  EEC  and  22.0%  in  the  USA,  while  the  corresponding  rates  against
the  industrial  countries  are  2.1%  and 18.4%,  respectively.  Other  product
categories  where  this  loading  of rates  against  the  HICs trade  occurs  include
other  textile  and  clothing  categories,  fruits  and  nuts,  and  leather  manufac-
tures. There  are  various  categories  where  the  loading  exists  in  one  or two
markets  but  not in  the  others,  e.g.,  fish,  footwear  and  furniture  in  the  EEC;
organic  chemicals  in  Japan.
These  higher  rates  do  not  stem  from  country-specific  discrimination,
since  preferences  are  intended  to  give  a margin  in  favor  of the  developing
countries. Rather,  the  HICs  --  and  developing  countries  generally  --  tend  to
export  the  items  which  have  higher  rates  of duty  in industrial  countries. Not
only  were  these  items  not  taken  into  account  in the  earlier  rounds  of  multi-
lateral  trade  negotiations  because  the  developing  countries  did  not  fully
negotiate  (Finger,  1974,  1976)  --  but  they  are  often  excluded  from  prefer-
entia'  schemes.- 13  -
An indication  of the  significance  of tariff  preferences  to the  HICs
can  be obtained  from  Table  3.  For  the  HICs  as  a group  the  value  of 1983
imports  by the  OECD  donors  from  the  HICs  under  the  GSP  was  estimated  at $1,265
million. This is  the  equivalent  of a mere 1.6%  of their  exports  in  that
year.  The  small  size  of these  estimated  GSP  benefits  is  attributable  to the
concentration  of basic  commodity  exports  among  the  HICs,  since  these  commod-
ities  either  faced  zero-MFN  rates  or were  often  excluded  from  GSP  benefits,
for  example,  petroleum,  minerals  and  many  agricultural  products,  etc. Brazil,
Yugoslavia,  Mexico,  Morocco  and  the  Philippines  accounted  for  75%  of the  total
GSP  benefits  of the  HICs,  but  the  major  relative  gainer  was  Costa  Rica.  It is
also  clear  that  the  losses  that  Chile  might  suffer  as  a result  of its  recent
exclusion  by the  United  States  are  quite  minor.  1/
With  respect  to  nontariff  barriers  we examine  first  the  extent  of
NTBs  in the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  United  States  in 1986  against  the  HICs  and
against  other  industrial  countries  - see  Annex  Table  2 for  detailed  results.
The  indicator  used  is  the  percentage  of trade  covered  by NTBs. The  NTBs  used
in  the  construction  of the  tables  include  only  relatively  restrictive  or hard-
core  measures  --  quota  restrictions,  MFA,  VERs,  variable  levies  and  non-
automatic  licensing.  2/
The  overall  results  show  that  the  EEC imports  from  the  HICs  are  much
more  affected  by the  presence  of hard-core  NTBs  than  other  industrialized
country  suppliers,  but  in  the  USA  or Japan  the  bias  is  against  other
1/ For  a more  extensive  discussion  on  preferences,  see  Laird  and  Sapir
(1987).
2/  Some  care  should  be used  in interpreting  these  data  for  comparative
purposes,  as the  indicator  has  a bias  in  that  the  more  restrictive
measures  may  preclude  trade.  Thus  the  trade  coverage  ratio  in  a sector
subject  to  prohibitions  would  equal  zero.  It is  sometimes  suggested  that
world  trade  weights  be used,  as a proxy  for  "free  trade"  weights  to
eliminate  this  downward  bias. However,  this  assumes  that import-demand
patterns  for  different  countries  would  be the  same.  In  addition,  many
markets  protect  the  same  sectors,  so  that  world  weights  are  also  affected.- 14 -
Table  3:  THE  HICs  & GSP IN  OECD  DONOR  COUNTRIES
DIRECT  TRADE  EFFECTS  OF THE  GSP
Increased
Countries  Exports  OECD Imports
by HICs  from  HICs
to  OECD  as Result  of  GSP
$M  $M  %
ARGENTINA  3,344.5  55.2  1.7
BOLIVIA  377.7  6.5  1.7
BRAZTL  13,741.5  303.5  2.2
CHILE  2,803.0  12.5  0.4
COLOMBIA  2,513.8  23.7  0.9
COSTA  RICA  749.6  53.9  7.2
COTE  D'IVOIRE  1,733.5  37.8  2.2
ECUADOR  1,624.3  7.5  0.5
JAMAICA  572.1  19.1  3.3
MEXICO  21,562.3  207.0  1.0
MOROCCO  1,434.6  76.5  5.3
NIGERIA  10,703.6  6.0  0.1
PERU  2,355.9  31.2  1.3
PHILIPPINES  4,328.8  124.6  2.9
URUGUAY  683.5  18.0  2.6
VENEZUELA  9,298.0  42.4  0.5
YUGOSLAVIA  3,625.5  239.6  6.6
HICS  81,452.2  1,265.0  1.C
Source: Karsenty  and  Laird  (1987).- 15 -
industrial  countries. 1/ With  respect  to individual  sectors,  the  discrimi-
natory  effects  of the  MFA is  evident  in  the  textile  and  clothing  sectors  in
the  EEC  and  the  United  States  and  to a lesser  extent  in  Japan. Other  products
where  the  incidence  of the  measures  is  higher  against  the  HICs  are:  (i)  in
the  EEC  --  alcoholic  beverages,  cereals  preparations,  coal,  iron  and  steel
pipes  and tubes,  crude  petroleum,  vegetables,  non-electric  power  machinery,
tinned  fish,  paper  and  paperboard,  electrical  machinery  nes  and  pig  iron,  (ii)
in  Japan  --  animal  oils  & fats,  cheese  and  curd,  crude  vegetable  materials,
sugar  preparations,  preserved  fruits,  and  oil  seeds,  and (iii)  in the  USA  --
cheese  and  curd,  coal,  driedi  and  preserved  fruits,  vegetable  oils,  sugar  and
honey,  floor  coverings,  and iron  and  steel  products.
The  main  changes  in  hard-core  NTBs  in  the  major  industrial  markets
are  shown  in  Table  4.  As  may  be observed,  on the  basis  of the  data  available,
there  has  been  no  measurable  change  in  the  overall  incidence  of  NTBs in  Japan
in the  1980s. (However,  there  have  been  reports  of Japan  restricting  imports
of textiles  from  China,  including  Taiwan  Province,  Republic  of Korea  and
Pakistan  by the  use  of "administrative  guidelines"  for  textile  importers  - see
Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  12  September  1985). The table  shows  a number  of
changes  in  the  EEC  and  tta  USA.  In  both  markets  the  overall  incidence  of NTBs
rose  against  both  FICs  and  the  industrialized  countries. The  main  HICs
exports  adversely  affected  were:  (i)  in the  EEC  --  MFA  articles,  cocoa,  fresh
and  dried  fruits  and  nuts,  fresh  vegetables,  leather,  tinned  fish,  and
electrical  machinery  nes,  and (ii)  in  the  United  States  --  sugar,  and iron  and
steel  sheets,  plates,  pipes  and tubes. The  overall  results  for  the  US  are
affected  by the  invocation  of sugar  quotas  in 1982.
It  should  be  noted  that  the  tightening  of  existing  quotas  is  not
identified  by the  computation  of trade-coverage  ratios. Thus,  the  increase  in
protection  is  understated  in  the  figures  given  above.
1/ However,  further  calculation  using  the  frequency  of transactions  (tariff
items  times  trading  partners)  --  not  biased  by the  restraint  of the  NTB in
the  trade-weighting  technique  --  show  discrimination  in  all  three  major
markets. These  results  are  available  from  the  authors  on request.- 16 -
Table  4: CHANGES  IN  NTBs IN  EEC,  JAPAN  AND  USA  AGAINST  HICs  KEY  EXPORTS,  1981  & 1986
SITC Product  Description  Imports  Percentage  of trade  affected  by  hard-core  N4TBS
From  HICS  HICS  LDCS  Industrial
S000  1983  81  86  81  86  81  86
EEC
All  Products  27,494,412  16.3  18.1  20.5  21.3  8.8  11.5
841  Clothing  not  of fur  558,115  81.9  84.7  70.6  70.2  14.3  9.7
732 Road  motor  vehicles  512,503  0.6  0.6  2.2  2.2  34.9  41.8
052  Dried  fru ,  491,376  22.0  23.8  8.8  10.2  45.9  52.3
051  Fruit  frst 'uts  frsh  dry  293,364  0.0  20.8  0.2  8.1  1.2  19.3
262 Wool  and  animal  hair  181,458  42.7  37.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
054  Veg  etc.  frsh,smpl'  prsvd  163,982  45.7  54.8  77.5  80.1  20.1  37.9
611  Leather  134,791  13.4  20.0  22.4  37.5  16.5  18.8
099 Food  preparations  NES  133,932  22.5  4.7  4.3  3.7  4.2  3.5
032 Fish  etc.  tinned,prepared 127,621  0.1  35.9  3.9  22.4  0.1  0.2
641 Paper  and  paperboard  102,578  31.5  29.9  10.4  7.7  7.6  7.5
729 Electrical  machinery  NES  89,502  0.2  22.9  0.6  9.6  3.2  6.7
684 Aluminum  69,744  0.0  0.0  9.5  4.9  0.0  0.0
USA
All  Products  36,840,554  0.9  4.2  7.0  5.3  9.2  13.2
724 Telecommunications  equip 1,000,500  0.0  0.0  27.2  14.5  0.0  0.0
851  Footwear  639,702  0.0  0.0  78.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
061  Sugar  and  honey  473,958  0.0  91.3  0.0  89.8  0.0  64.9
674  Irn,stl  univ,plate,sheet  169,138  0.0  90.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  66.8
678  Irn,stl  pipes,  tubes  etc.  138,711  0.0  98.5  0.0  87.5  0.0  81.6
698  Metal  Manufactures  NES  85,045  0.0  1.9  0.0  7.6  0.0  1.1
Japan
All  products  7,368,680  9.6  9.6  11.4  11.4  28.9  28.9
292  Crude  veg  materials  nes  106,539  77.9  77.3  24.4  22.9  26.9  17.6
053  Fruit  preserved,prepared  87,667  72.8  70.2  59.3  58.5  33.2  32.9
Note: A constant  1984  trade  base  was  used  for  the  calcusations,  so  that  changes  In  the  per-
centages  can  only  result  from  the  spread  of NTBS  to new  countries  or to  new  tariff  lines.
Hard  core  NTBS  are  dlefined  to include  QRS,  VERS,  WA,  variable  levies  and  non-automatic  licensing.
Source:  UNCTAD  data  base  on  trade  measures,  UN  COMTRADE  Data  Base.- 17 -
B.  Administered  Protection:  The  Case  of Antidumping  and
Countervailing  Duties  Against  the  HICs
Antidumping  (AD)  and countervailing  duty  (CVD)  mechanisms  are  used
when  countries  find  that  imports  enter  at "unfairly"  low  prices. Unfairness
according  to these  procedures  can  have  two  origins;  dumping  actions  of
individual  firms,  or subsidies  granted  by a foreign  government  of the  foreign
country  to its  exports. The first  type  can  result  in  AD investigations,  while
the  second  might  result  in  CVD  actions.
1. Countervailing  actions
Of  the  460 CVD  cases  reported  to  the  GATT  between  1980 and  1986,  281
were  processed  in the  US,  11 in  Canada,  20 in  Australia  and  only 7  in  the
EEC.  Among  developing  countries,  Chile  has  been  the  most important  user,
introducing  140  CVDs  against  imports  coming  mainly  from  neighboring
countries. But  of these  cases,  125  were  processed  between  1982  and 1984  when
Chile  was  facing  serious  payments  problems;  all  ended  with  a  negative
finding. During  1985  and  1986,  it initiated  only  12  CVD investigations  and
only  one  was  positive.
Today  as in the  past,  the  US is the  dominant  user  of CVDs.  And  the
number  of US CVDs  has  risen  sharply.  Between  1975  and 1979,  the  US processed
104  CVD  cases;  21  annually. During  1980-1986  the  annual  number  more than
tripled  to  66.  Annex  Table  3 shows  that  of the  281  CVD  cases  initiated  in  the
US during  1980-86,  30  percent  were  against  imports  from  HICs. Of these,  60
percent  were  against  Brazil  and  Mexico,  the  most  indebted  HICs,  particularly
vis-a-vis  US banks.
Our  conjecture  is  that  this  increase  in  CVDs  has  been triggered  by  a
rapid  growth  in  competitive  imports,  and  also,  by the  change  of rules  which
became  operative  in 1980  (see  Marks,  1980).  These  changes  have  made it  easier
for  the  US-CVD  mechanism  to  harass  importers.  Finger  and  Nogues  (1987)  have
found  that  35 percent  of the  CVD investigations  initiated  between  1980  and
1985  had  preliminary  affirmative  but  then  a final  negative  determinations.  If
these  investigations  had  been  better  documented  in the  initial  stages,  they- 18 -
would  have  been  more consistent  with  the  outcome  of findings  in  the  final
stages. While  there  is  a  great  range  of US-CVD  rates  against  the  HICs,  the
average  CVD  rate  of 21 percent  is  more than  six  times  higher  than  the  US
average  --  import  weighted  --  applied  tariff  rate  of 3.4  percent. It is clear
that  CVDs  must  have  a serious  detrimental  effect  on exporters  found  or
presumed  to be  using  export  subsidies.
2.  Antidumping  actions
During  the  1980s,  the  growth  of AD cases  has  also  been  alarming.
Between  1980 and  1986  there  has  been  a total  of  1,272  reported  AD  cases.  1/
In  the  EC,  during  1971-75  and  1976-80  there  were  17 and  79  AD  cases  respec-
tively. In  contrast,  during  1981-85  the  number  of AD  cases  was  97.  In  the
US,  between  1975 and  1979  the  number  of  AD  cases  was  97;  between  1980-86  this
increased  to  350.
Annex  Table  4 shows  for 1980-86  the  numaer  of antidumping  (AD)  cases
opened  in  the  US,  EEC,  Australia  and  Canada  against  the  HICs. The  following
points  are  worth  noting. First,  the  proportion  of US AD investigations
against  imports  coming  from  HICs  is  smaller  than  in  the  case  of CVDs,  i.e.,  21
percent  vs.  29  percent. One  explanation  for  this,  is  that  according  to  GATT
Article  XVI,  the  use  of export  subsidies  is  allowed  only  to  developing
countries,  but,  neither  the  GATT  nor  the  Subsidy  Code  prohibits  countervailing
duties  against  developing  countries.  This  helps  to explain  why  export
subsidies  are  more  prevalent  among  developing  countries  and  also  why the
incidence  of industrial  countries'  countervailing  cases  against  the  HICs is
higher  than  that  of antidumping  cases. In  any  case,  because  --  unlike  CVDs  --
Australia,  Canada  and  the  EEC  have  been  active  users  of AD duties,  during
1980-86  the  absolute  number  of AD cases  against  the  HICs  has  been  higher  than
that  of CVDs (130  against  82).
Table  5 shows  numbers  of the  incidence  of industrial  countries  AD
actions  against  the  HICs  for  two  periods  1980-81  --  before  the  debt  crisis  --
and 1982-86.  The  figures  show  that,  the  proportion  of total  AD  actions,  taken
against  the  HICs  almost  tripled  during  the  recent  years  of continuing  balance
of payments  problems. Regrettably,  this  behavior  of the  creditor  countries
1/  A  case  might  involve  many  countries  and  many  firms.- 19  -
Table  5:  INCIDENCE  OF ANTIDUMPING  ACTIONS  AGAINST  THE  HICs
1980-81  and 1982-86
AD  Actii  s  Against  the  HICs  as  a % of:
AD Actions  Total  AD  actions  AD Against  LDCs
Taken  by  1980-81  1982-86  1980-81  1982-86
Australia  2.8  4.5  7.7  14.9
Canada  4.2  6.6  20.0  27.3
EC  5.6  16.3  26.7  49.3
USA  5.6  18.1  25.0  42.1
Total  4.1  11.4  15.2  34.1
Source: GATT files.
has  occurred  during  a period  when  the  majority  of HICs  have  been  making
efforts  to adjust  and  service  their  debts.
IV.  Impact  of  Major  Creditor  Country  Trade  Policies  on the  HICs
In  the  present  section  we examine  the  foreign  exchange  costs  of trade
policies  with  the  emphasis  being  on the  effects  of industrial  countries'
protectionist  policies.  1/ From  the  outset,  let  it  be said  that  we are  struck
by the  growth  in the  value  of HICs  manufactured  exports  to the  industrial
countries,  by  almost  100  percent  between  1980  and 1986,  although  there  is
considerable  variation  in  the  performance  of individual  HICs. This  is
evidence  of some  "porosity"  of the  NTBs,  assoS  ated  with  the  ability  of
1/ This  does  not imply  that  the  HICs  own  policies  are  less  harmful  to them.
For  example,  Sturzenegger  (1988)  recently  estimated  that,  if  during  the
early  80s,  Argentina  had  shifted  to  a free  trade  economy,  it  would  have
increased  its  annual  exports  of agricultural  goods  by  around  $6  billion.
This  figure  is  much  higher  than  our  estimates  of the  foreign  exchange
costs  of industrial  countries'  policies.- 20 -
exporters  to get  round  the  barriers  by  shifting  production  to other  lines,  not
yet  subject  to the  more  stringent  barriers. The Asian  NICs in  particular  seem
to have  been  adept  at exploiting  such  opportunities.  Nevertheless,  there  are
NTBs  such  as quotas,  which  inhibit  developing  countries  attempting  to  expand
their  exports.
In  order  to  provide  a rough  order  of  magnitude  of the  potential
export  gains  for  the  HICs  from  liberalization  of tariff  and  nontariff  barriers
in  the  major  industrialized  countries,  simulations  were  made  using  a standard,
simple  ex ante  partial  equilibrium  model  to  compute  trade-creation  and trade-
diversion  effects  of the  postulated  trade  liberalization.  1/
In  the  model,  data  on the  ad valorem  equivalents  of  nontariff
barriers  are  treated  in  the  same  way  as dati  on tariffs. The information  on
the  ad valorem  equivalents  of the  NTB  was  compiled  from  a search  through
studies  published  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.  2/  These  studies
typically  identify  the  price  disadvantage  of domestically  produced  goods
relative  to international  prices,  and the  NTB  ad valorem  equivalent  is  assumed
to  equal  the  percentage  price  -isadvantage  less  the  tariff  rate. This is  not
completely  satisfactory  but  it  does  give  a rough  order  of  magnitude  for  the
trade  effects  of  NTBs. Obviously  these  ad valorem  equivalents  must  vary
according  to international  prices  and  any  point  estimate  will  often  be higher
or lower  than  the  situation  at other  points  of time. An alternative  approach
was  used  for  products  affected  by  variable  levies  in  the  EC,  where  data  are
1/  For  a description  of the  model  and  sources  of data  and  elasticities,  see
Laird  and  Yeats,  1986. The  methodology  is  similar  to that  used  by the
Brookings  Institution  for  its  evaluation  of the  Tokyo  Round. In  the
present  study,  the  supply  elasticities  were  assumed  to  be infinite  - not
unreasonable  in  the  light  of the  magnitude  of the  projected  changes  and
the  fact  that  this  is  comparative  static  analysis  with  no short-run
expectations  of changes.  It  is  also  noted  that  under  imperfect  supply
conditions,  while  the  volume  growth  is  less  than  under  perfectly  elastic
supply,  a price  effect  means  that  the  revenue  changes  are  less  than  the
volume  changes. The  elasticity  of substitution  among  suppliers  was
assumed  to  be 2.5.
2/  To be published  in  Laird,  S. and  A.  Yeats,  "Quantitative  Methods  for  Trade
Barriers  Analysis"  (forthcoming).- 21 -
available  on  movements  over  time.  In  these  cases,  average  figures  over  a
three  to five-year  period  (varying  between  1975  and 1983)  was  used  to compute
the  price  disadvantages.
The  study  was  carried  out  at the  most  detailed  tariff-line  level  to
get  the  greatest  information  on product  categories  most likely  to be  affected
by changes  in the  trade  regimes  of the  industrialized  countries. For  presen-
tational  purposes,  the  results  have  been  aggregated  to the  3-digit  SITC
level. Only the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  United  States  markets  were  selected  for
study  since  published  material  exists  on the  restrictiveness  of  NTBs in these
markets.
The  results  of the  simulation  are  presented  in  Tables  6  and 7.  As
may  be  noted  from  the  tables,  the  overall  increase  in  imports  by the  EC,  Japan
and  the  US from  the  HICs  from  full  trade  liberalization  in  these  markets  is
estimated  at $6.5  billion  --  an expansion  of 9.1  percent. Since  the  moderate
overall  results  is  based  on  all  trade  from  all  the  HICs  --  including  many
items  which  are  free  of trade  restrictions  --  it  conceals  much  greater  gains
for  certain  of the  HICs  and  for  products  which  are  currently  subject  to
several  restraints.  For  example,  the  gains  for  the  HICs  with  relatively
diversified  export  structures  and  substantial  manufactured  exports  do much
better  than  average  (e.g.,  Philippines  - 26.6  percent,  Yugoslavia  - 24.9
percent,  Morocco  - 21.1  percent,  etc.) Above  average  gains  are  also
registered  by countries  which  are  relatively  important  exporters  of highly
protected  food  products  such  as sugar  and  meat  (Argentina,  Brazil,
Philippines).  The  countries  which  gain  least  are  those  with  a  much  higher
proportion  of petroleum  or mineral  exports  (Bolivia,  Chile,  Ecuador,  Jamaica,
Mexico,  Peru  and  Venezuela)  or for  which  coffee  or  coca  are  a major  component
of their  exports  (Colombia,  Cote  d'Ivoire).
The  overall  average  is  weighed  down  by petroleum  --  which  is
virtually  free  of  trade  restraints.  If  petroleum  and  petroleum  products  are
excluded,  the  overall  average  increase  in imports  from  the  HICs  would  be 25
percent. Even  this  conceals  substantially  greater  percentage  gains  for
products  most  affected  by trade  barriers. Clothing  alone  --  with  a gain  of
108.1  percent  --  accounts  for  20 percent  of the  total  expansion.  Manufactured- 22  -
Table  6: EFFECTS  OF TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  IN  EEC,  JAPAN  &  USA
COUNTRY  IMPORTS  INCREASE  IN IMPORTS  FROM
1983  FULL  MFN  LIBERALIZATION  OF
$  000  TARIFFS  NzBS  TARIFFS  & NTBS
$  000  $  000  $  000
ALL  HICS  71,703,646  2,666,691  3,830,232  6,491,479  9.1
ARGENTINA  2,775,623  101,536  337,631  439,240  15.8
BOLIVIA  345,050  3,657  12,814  16,384  4.6
BRAZIL  11,604,209  707,734  1,218,313  1,924,513  16.5
CHILE  2,555,522  22,060  90,598  112,608  4.3
COLOMBIA  2,022,806  90,081  89,434  179,422  8.9
COSTA  RICA  591,130  51,889  68,435  121,175  20.4
COTE  D'IVOIRE  1,646,662  45,319  47,996  93,551  5.7
ECUADOR  1,554,938  16,167  87,524  103,673  6.6
JAMAICA  372,842  15,384  14,256  29,854  7.8
MOROCCO  1,311,321  93,298  183,975  276,755  21.1
MEXICO  19,581,628  693,289  541,561  1,233,797  6.3
NIGERIA  10,195,969  25,138  9,792  35,004  0.3
PERU  2,188,116  29,339  76,402  105,621  4.8
PHILIPPINES  3,366,2V2  375,311  522,546  895,832  26.6
URUGUAY  575,270  29,580  56,345  85,896  14.8
VENEZUELA  8,237,109  95,623  49,031  144,738  1.7
YUGOSLAVIA  2,779,249  271,288  423,578  693,416  24.9
Note: Estimates  by the  authors. Tariff  and  trade  information  were  taken
from  the  GATT  Tariff  Study. Information  on the  ad valorem  equivalents
of NTBs  was  taken  from  a literature  search  by Laird  and  Yeats  (op.
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TABLE  7:  EFFECTS  OF TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  IN EEC, JAPAN  & USA
TRADE  CHANGE  FOR  HICs RESULTING  FROM  MfN LIBERALIZATION
30 3  11IGIT  SITC3  ITEMS  TO GAIN MOST  IN TERMS
OF TRADE  VALUES
(Data  ranked  in  order  of  declining  size  of  value  Increment  associated  with  the
simultaneous  liberalization  of  tariffs  and  NTBs)
IMPORTS INCREASE  IN  IMPORTS  RESULTING  FROM  FULL LIBERALIZATION  OF
SITC  PRODUCT  DESCRIPTION  1983  TARIFFS  NTBS  TARIFFS  & NTBS
S 000  S 000  5  S 000  S  S 000  %
ALL  TOTAL  TRADE  71,703,646  2,666,691  3.7  3,830,232  5.3  6,491,479  9.1
841  CLOTHING  NOT  OF FUR  1,274,377  503,276  39.5  876,677  68.8  1,377,146  108.1
081  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  5,978,148  82,139  1.4  705,440  11.8  787,588  13.2
851  FOOTWEAR  808,884  265,516  32.8  289,347  35.8  554,699  68.6
032  FISH ETC. TII"ED,PREPARED  1,000,959  20,188  2.0  353,735  35.3  374,040  37.4
422  FIXED VEG  OIL  NONSOFT  525,495  17,639  3.4  149,089  28.4  166,173  31.6
053  FRUIT  PRESERVED,PREPAREf.  556,017  119,031  21.4  46,993  8.5  166,159  29.9
013  MEAT  TINNED  NES  OR  PREPi)  411,540  39,425  9.6  111,015  27.0  150,381  36.5
031  FISH FRESH,SIMPLY  PRESVD  494,556  21,893  4.4  121,593  24.6  143,502  29.0
821  FURNITURE  319,370  52,792  16.5  88,249  27.6  140,912  44.1
724  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIP  1,033,454  138,915  13.4  4  0.0  138,919  13.4
332  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  19,402,676  135,359  0.7  0  0.0  135,359  0.7
651  TEXTILE  YARN  AND  THREAD  265,644  12,641  4.8  96,658  6.4  108,779  40.9
671  PIG  IRON  ETC.  382,516  25,731  6.7  67,149  17.6  92,624  24.2
011  MEAT  FRESH,CHILLD,FROZEN  272,435  13,588  5.0  76,575  28.1  90,308  33.1
052  DRIED  FRUIT  1,214,190  88,480  7.3  176  0.0  88,657  7.3
682  COPPER  1,527,921  10,107  0.7  77,750  5.1  87,974  5.8
891  SOUND  RECORDVRS,PRODUCRS 224,716  21,296  9.5  64,612  28.8  85,882  38.2
674  IRN,STL UNIV,PLATE,SHEET  231,992  23,455  10.1  54,066  23.3  77,514  33.4
652  COTTON  FABRICS,WOVEN  172,111  10,261  6.0  67,097  39.0  76,755  44.6
732  ROAD  MOTOR  VEHICLES  599,689  71,531  11.9  0  0.0  71,531  11.9
099  FOOD  PREPARATIONS  NES  331,705  22,013  6.6  46,'02  13.9  67,946  20.5
729  ELECTRICAL  MACHINERY  NES  572,141  61,739  10.8  0  0.0  61,739  10.8
711  POWER  MACHINERY  NON-ELEC  831,684  60,034  7.2  59  0.0  60,104  7.2
061  SUGAR  AND  HONEY  537,973  55,402  10.3  3,960  0.7  59,381  11.0
684  ALUMINUM  636,963  41,742  6.6  15,919  2.5  57,849  9.1
331  CRUDE  PETROLEUM,ETC  11,629,240  53,087  0.5  0  0.0  53,087  0.5
678  IRON,STL  PIPES, TUBES  159,406  9,407  5.9  41,806  26.2  51,155  32.1
655  SPECIAL  TEXTILE  ETC. PROD  88,002  1,894  2.2  49 229  55.9  50,999  58.0
054  VEG  ETC. FRSH,SMPLY  PRSVD  596,177  16,614  2.8  31,365  5.3  47,847  8.0
Source:  Estimates  by  the  authors.  The tariff  liberalization  is  based on  reducing  1983 applied  rates
to  zero  for  tariff  items  from  all  sources.  The ad  valorem  equivalents  of  the  NTBs were  culled
from  a literature  search  by  Laird  and  Yeats  (op.  cit.).  The studies  surveyed  were  carried  out
in  the late  1970s and early  1980s.  For  this  reason  they  do not  fully  reflect  the  Increases  In
protectIon  that  occurred  under  domestic  price  support  schemes when commodity  prices  fel I  In  the
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items  are  the  group  with  the  largest  gains  --  some  $2.6  billion  or  43.0
percent  of  the  total,  followed  by  agricultural  products  (excluding  fish  and
fish  products)  accounting  for  $1.5  billion  or  23.5  percent  of  the  total
increment.
While  the  removal  of  NTBs  leads  to  a  greater  increase  in  export
earnings  than  the  tariff  reductions  ($3.8  billion,  compared  with  $2.7
billion),  it  is  none  the  less  obvious  that  tariff  cuts  would  also  be  of  major
importance.  However,  some  of  the  expected  gains  from  tariff  liberalization
would  not  be  attained  unless  there  were  sufficient  rvlaxation  of  NTBs  to  allow
the  trade  expansion  to  take  place.
We  consider  these  to  be  conservative  estimates  since  the  study  uses
ad  valorem  equivalents  of  the  NTBs  mEinly  from  studies  which  identify  the
price  disadvantages  in  the  industrial  countries  vis-a-vis  average  world
prices.  To  the  extent  that  developing  countries'  export  prices  are  lower  than
these  average  world  prices,  they  would  gain  more  than  shown.  Moreover,  our
estimates  of  the  ad  valorem  equivalents  of  some  NTBs  are  averages  over  several
years  rather  than  estimates  at  peak  differentials  between  domestic  and
international  prices.  Finally,  our  estimates  omit  some  recent  important
protectionist  measures  having  negative  consequences  on  the  export  of  the
HICs. Among  others,  these  policies  include  MFA  IV  and  other  VERs,  unfair
trade  cases,  antidumping  and  countervailing  investigations,  subsidies  to
agricultural  exports.
It  is  difficult  to  compare  our  results  with  those  of  other  studies  of
the  effects  of  trade  liberalization  because  of  differences  in  the  coverage  of
products,  countries  and  policy  instruments  being  studies,  as  well  as
differences  in  the  scope  of  the  scenarios  being  modelled.  For  example,  our
study  has  focused  on  changes  in  imports  from  the  HICs  by  the  EC,  Japan  and  the
US  as  a  consequence  of  the  liberalization  of  their  barriers  against  imports.
By  contrast,  a  number  of  recent  studies  1/  in  the  agricultural  sector  look  at
the  global  impact  of  cessation  of  trade  intervention,  including  the
1/ See  the  World  Development  Report  1986  for  references.  Many  of  the  studies
were  commissioned  as  background  papers  for  that  report.- 25  -
elimination  of export  subsidies,  by all  industrial  countries  (in  some  cases
even  the  liberalization  of barriers  by developing  countries).  This  difference
in  the  coverage  of these  studies  is  particularly  important  where  other
developing  countries  or their  socialist  countries  constitute  the  major  markets
for  the  HICs  exports,  e.g.,  as in  the  case  of grains.
The  results  of one  if these  studies  can  be compared  in  some  detail
with  our  own  results. It  utilizes  very  detailed  information  on elasticities
in  a similar  type  of model,  but  the  authors  (Zietz  and  Vald6s,  1986)
explicitly  allowed  for  price  effects  through  the  interplay  of demand  and
noninfinite  supply  elasticities.  They  get  substantially  higher  increased
export  revenues  under  trade  liberalization  for  the  four  products  which  their
study  covers. Zietz  and  Vald6s  studied  the  global  effects  of trade
liberalization  in  the  industrialized  countries'  markets  for  sugar,  beef,  wheat
and  maize,  i.e.,  the  extent  to  which  developing  countries  exports  would
increase  in  all  markets  if the  industrialized  countries  eliminated  trade
interventions.  This  contrasts  with  our  study  which  looks  only  at the  change
in imports  in  the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  US associated  with  changes  in  their
import  regimes. The  Zietz/Vald6s  results  for 13  of the  17  HICs  are summarized
in  Table  8.  Their  estimates  are  greater  than  ours  for  all  products. Zietz
and  Vald6s'  information  on  elasticities  for  these  products  is  more precise
than  those  used  in  our  more  general  study  and  their  NTB information  reflects
some  recent  increases  in  the  restrictiveness  of certain  measures  as world
prices  have  fallen  (for  example,  NTB  estimates  on sugar  in  ou!r  data  base
predate  the  imposition  of US sugar  quotas  following  the  decline  in  world
prices  and  our  estimates  on EC  variable  levies  for  a number  of products  levied
by  the  CAP  are  based  on averages  over  several  years). Most importantly,  they
looked  at the  expansion  of  world  markets  --  while  our  focus  was  what  would
happen  in  the  main  OECD  markets. As  mentioned,  these  are  much  less  important
for  export  of grains  from  the  HICs  than  other  developing  country  markets.
Our  estimates  for  the  increased  EC,  Japanese  and  US imports  of sugar
and  meat  items  from  the  HICs  are  some  $300  million  and  we get  no significant
gains  for  wheat  and  maize  (although  animal  feeding  stuff  shows  the  second
largest  expansion  in value  terms). By contrast,  Zietz  and  Vald6s  show  an- 26 -
Table  8:  INCREASED  EXPORT  REVENUES  ESTIMATED  TO RESULT  FROM  TRADE
LIBERALIZATION  IN  THE INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES  FOR  4 MAJOR
COMMODITIES  - RESULTS  FOR 13  HIGHLY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
Exporter  Commodity
Sugar  Beef  Wheat  Maize  Total
$  million
Argentina  42.1  310.7  98.1  97.1  548.0
Bolivia  5.7  0.0  0.0  0.5  6.3
Brazil  177.0  96.6  0.0  -8.8  264.8
Chile  0.0  7.1  0.0  0.0  7.1
Colombia  21.0  37.1  0.0  0.0  58.1
Cote  d'Ivoire  1.8  0.0  0.0  -0.1  1.7
Ecuador  5.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.5
Morocco  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  1.6
Mexico  -0.9  18.4  0.0  0.0  17.5
Nigeria  0.0  -2.6  0.0  0.0  -2.6
Peru  5.2  1.2  0.0  0.0  6.4
Philippines  82.8  0.5  0.0  -0.7  82.6
Venezuela  0.0  17.1  0.0  0.0  17.1
Total  340.2  487.7  98.1  88.0  1,014.1
Notes: The  estimates  are  changes  in  the  basic  date  which  were  average  1979-81
data  for  production,  consumption,  exports  and imports. The  results
for  sugar  are  based  on estimates  of production  under  average  1979-81
prices. Costa  Rica,  Jamaica  and  Yugoslavia  are  not  reported  by Zietz
and  Vald6s.
Source: Extracted  from  Zietz  and  Vald6s  (1986).- 27 -
increase  in  HICg  exports  to  the  world  just  over  $1 billion  as a consequence  of
the  cessation  of trade  intervention  by the  industrialized  countries. Taking
these  results  together,  we would  increase  our  overall  estimated  gains  to the
HICs  from  industrialized  countries'  trade  liberalization  by the  difference  of
$700  million  between  the  results  of the  two  studies,  i.e.,  increasing  the
estimated  overall  gains  to the  HICs  from  $6.5  billion  to $7.2  billion.
While  Zietz  and  Vald6s  results  permit  the  extraction  of information
on the  gains  to  most  of the  HICs,  this  is  more  difficult  with  other  studies  of
the  agricultural  sector  carried  out  for  the  WDR 1987. Tyers  and  Anderson
(1986)  do show  separate  results  for  some  HICs'  exports  to the  world  from  trade
liberalization  in  all  developed  market  economies  in  the  following  sectors:
wheat,  coarse  grains,  rice,  meat,  dairy  products  and  sugar. The  foreign
exchange  gains  in 1985  (expressed  in  constant  1980  US dollars)  are:  Argentina
- $1.8  billion,  Brazil  - $2.0  billion,  Mexico  - $.0.9  billion,  and  Philippines
- $0.2  billion. The  comparable  results  from  our  study  for  the  expansion  of
imports  from  these  HICs  by the  EC,  Japan  and the  USA  are:  Argentina  - $0.3
billion,  Brazil  - $0.9  billion,  Mexico  - $7  million  and  Philippines  - $56
million  (all  expressed  as increments  over 1983  trade). The  lack  of  any
consistent  pattern  of divergence  between  our  results  and  those  of  Tyers  and
Anderson  demonstrates  clearly  the  difficulty  of  making  comparisons  where
different  trade  patterns  and  markets  are  involved. The relative  closeness  of
the  two  sets  of results  in  the  case  of  Brazil  merely  reflects  the  greater
proportion  of Brazilian  trade  in  these  products  going  to the  EC,  Japan  and  the
US than  is the  case  for  the  other  HICs  common  to both  studies.
One important  point  made in  the  specialized  agricultural  studies  is
that  trade  liberalization  could  lead  to increased  world  food  prices. To the
extent  that  some  of the  HICs  are  not  food  importers,  the  effects  of trade
liberalization  by the  industrial  countries  could  have  some  negative  impact  as
their  current  account  balances.
None  of the  studies,  including  our  own  takes  adequate  account  of the
effects  on levels  of protection  of variable  levies  and  other  domestic  price
support  mechanisms  as commodity  prices  fell  in  the  1980s. Zietz  and  Valdes  do
make  a separate  estimate  of the  additional  revenue  gains  for  developing- 28 -
countries'  exports  of sugar,  based  on 1983  prices. According  to  their  study,
the  exp.rt  gains  for  the  HICs  would  be $448.4  million  - some  $108.6  million
more than  the  average  1979-81  prices.
Clearly,  the  effects  of the  price  declines  in  the  1980s  for  some
major  commodities  such  as sugar  have  been  policy-related,  and  have  had  a
significant  impact  on the  HICs  export  revenues  during  the  debt  crisis. For
example,  we estimate  that  if 1980  prices  had  prevailed  through  1986,  the
export  earnings  of the  HICs  from  their  sugar  exports  would  have  been  $1.5
billion  greater  than  they  were (or  $0.9  billion  on the  basis  of the  average
1979-81  prices). As an illustration  of the  impact,  it is  estimated  that
Caribbean  exports  declined  by $258-305  million  in  consequence  (See  "Caribbean
Exports: Preferential  Markets  and  Performance"  Report  No.  7207  - CRG,  May 27,
1982,  The  World  Bank,  p. 11). The  increases  from  grains  (especially  animal
feedstock)  would  have  been  $1.2  billion  higher  (or  $1.0  on the  basis  of the
average  1979-81  prices). For  some  products  such  as beef,  prices  have
increased,  while  for  other  products,  such  as nonferrous  metals,  the  price
declines  are  not  specifically  related  to the  trade  regimes  of the
industrialized  countries.  1/
OECD (1986)  in  a study  of financing  and  external  debt  notes  that  the
problem  of declining  commodity  prices  is  clearly  not  one  which  can  be resolved
by further  attempts  to "manage"  commodity  markets,  "although  improved
cooperation  in  the  commodities  area,  such  as increasing  market  access  and
reducing  market  distortions  (to  be  pursued  in the  Uruguay  Round),  better
market  transparency,  and  new  efforts  to  provide  carefully  considered
assistance  for  structural  measures  in  commodity  dependent  countries,  should  be
a priority  for  the  international  community."  With  respect  to the  latter
point,  the  developing  countries  themselves  will  need  to play  a  major  role.
1/ We estimate  that  had 1980  commodity  prices  prevailed  for  all  major
commodities,  the  HICs  export  revenues  in  1986  would  have  been  some  $10.5
billion  higher  (or  $4.7  billion  on the  basis  of the  average  1979-81
prices). Full  details  of our  calculation  will  be made  available  on
request.- 29  -
As to the  effects  of the  increase  in  antidumping  actions  and  duties,
some  new  evidence  has  become  available  on the  "chilling'  effect  of such
measures. A study  by Patrick  Messerlin  (1988)  of the  effect  of EEC
antidumping  laws  on developing  countries  notes  that  the  first  year  after  the
initiation  of an investigation  imported  quantities  decreased  by 18  percent  on
average. However,  he states  that  "three  or four  years  after  the  initiation,
quantities  still  imported  represent  only  two  thirds  of the  imports  of the
initiation  year.  Five  years  after,  they  are  reduced  to  one  half  of the
initial  imports." He then  shows  that  a decision  to impose  antidumping  duties
leads  to  a further  reduction  in  imported  quantities. If  the  situation  has
been  so in the  EEC  --  where  average  dumping  duties  have  been 14  percent,  the
situation  has  been  worse  in  the  US --  where  the  average  dumping  margins
against  the  HICs  have  been  37 percent. Thus,  if  Messerlin's  estimates  also
hold  estimates  for  the  United  States,  then  HICs  exports  have  suffered  a severe
blow  as they  have  tried  to increase  exports  to  meet their  debt-repayment
obligations.
V.  Commodity  Concentration  and  Trade  Performance  of the  HICs
The  reasons  for  concern  over the  plight  of the  HICs  becomes  evident
from  even  a cursory  examination  of the  basic  data  on GNP,  trade,  foreign
reserves  and selected  debt indicators  (see  The  World  Debt  Tables,  1987).  For
the  HICs  as  a group,  since  1980  there  has  been  a decline  in  dollar  values  of
GNP,  exports  and import3,  and  foreign  reserves. Total  external  debt,  total
debt  service  and interest  payments  have increased.
As  was  mentioned  earlier,  the  HICs  exports  of  manufactures  to the
developed  countries  almost  doubled  between  1980  and 1986.  However,  looking  at
the  developed  country  imports  from  the  HICs (see  Table  9),  we can  see  that  the
total  value  of merchandise  trade  declined  by $7.5  billion  or 7.7  percent  in
the  same  period. Nonfuel  primaries  stagnated  (down  1.3  percent),  while  fuels
imports  from  the  HICs  by  value  were  cut in  half.  In 1980  total  imports  of
primaries  from  the  HICs  accounted  for  84.3  percent  of the  composition  of all
developed  country  imports  from  the  HICs,  but  by 1986  this  share  had  dropped  to
66.3  percent. One  of the  most  remarkable  performances  is  that  of Mexico  whose- 30  -
Table  9:  INDiUSTRIAL  COUNTRIES'  IMPORTS  FROM  HICS,  1980,  1986
(S  million)
Nonfuel  Fuels  Manufactured  1/  Total
Exporters  Primaries
1980  1986  1980  1986  1980  1986  1980  1986
Argentina  2,961  2,911  246  165  842  810  4,050  3,887
Bolivia  429  153  12  3  25  82  467  239
Brazil  9,621  9,981  73  465  3,493  7,418  13,189  17,865
Chile  3,212  2,907  3  2  149  256  3,364  3,166
Colombia  3,085  3,662  207  662  357  514  3,650  4,840
Costa  Rica  754  984  - 6  82  244  836  1,234
Cote  dlivoire  2,438  2,487  15  36  94  137  2,549  2,661
Ecuador  845  1,376  686  621  43  39  1,575  2,037
Jamaica  859  479  - 16  26  155  886  650
Morocco  1,613  1,336  77  15  409  820  2,101  2,171
Mexico  3,626  4,394  8,804  6,561  4,466  11,322  16,898  22,278
Nigeria  624  294  23,007  7,333  89  73  23,721  ,7,701
Peru  2,012  1,493  617  220  218  264  2,848  1,978
Philippines  3,474  2,260  20  29  1,859  2,472  5,355  4,762
Uruguay  189  247  7  - 290  599  487  847
Venezuela  647  837  10,733  6,348  249  484  11,629  7,670
Yugoslavia  1,012  1,131  283  235  2,588  4,612  3,883  5,979
Highly  Indebted  37,408  36,939  44,797  22,725  15,288  30,309  97,495  89,974
1/  Includes  SITC  categories  5 through  9  minus  68.
Source: UN  COMTRADE  Data  Base.- 31  -
overall  export  performance  improved,  despite  the  decline  in  oil  prices,  mainly
because  manufactured  exports  expanded  by  2.5  times. The  effects  of declining
nonfuel-commodity  prices  is  most  evident  in  the  overall  results  for  Bolivia,
Chile  and  Jamaica. In  the  manufactures  sector,  declines  occurred  only  for
Argentina,  Ecuador  and  Nigeria.
As  has  been  noted  by Keesing  (1981),  referring  to Latin  American
countries,  in  general,  "slow  increases  in  exports  have  been  caused  partly  by
the  dictates  of the  region's  resources,  leading  to  a heavy  concentration  in
primary  exports  which  we held  back  as a result  of slow  growth  of world  demand,
as in  coffee,  and  by a limited  ability  to increase  output  in  each  country
because  of natural-resource  supply  constraints."  This is  typical  of the
HICs. While  their  manufactured  exports  have  grown  substantially,  the  abundant
supply  of natural  resources  has  operated  on wages  and  exchange  rates,  making
it  difficult  to compete  in  world  markets  for  manufacturers.  However,  the
declining  commodity  prices  and  depreciating  real  exchange  rates  in the  1980s
in  the  HICs  have  contributed  to the  growth  of manufactured  exports. For
example,  we find  a correlation  coefficient  of 0.37 (significant  at the  99
percent  level)  between  year-to-year  movements  in the  individual  HICs  real
effective  exchange  rates  and  their  respective  changes  in  manufactured
exports. Helmers  (1988)  highlights  this  relationship  between  real  exchange
rate  movements  and  the  balance  of trade,  although  sometimes  with  a lagged
reaction  in the  trade  balance  to  exchange  rate  movements. There  seems  little
doubt  that  this  relationship  provides  a partial  explanation  for  the  growing
manufactured  exports  from  the  HICs  to  the  developed  countries,  despite  recent
increases  in  protection  in  the  latter  group  of countries.
The  pattern  of protection  in the  industrial  countries  also
contributes  to the  difficulties  of the  HICs  in  breaking  out  of the  existing
concentration  of production  and  exports. The  tightening  of industrial
countries'  NTBs  and  antidumping  actions  have  also inhibited  the  exploitation
of changes  in the  HICs  comparative  advantage. Thus,  these  measures  --  applied
abroad  against  their  exports  --  impose  allocative  inefficiencies  on the  HICs.
The  high  degree  of concentration  in  the  HICs  exports  is  evident  from
the  data  provided  - Annex  Table  5.  Crude  petroleum  and  petroleum  products- 32 -
accounted  for  almost  two  fifths  of their  exports  in 1983;  7  of the 17
countries  were  net  petroleum  exporters. There  is  also  a relatively  high
proportion  of other  commodity  exports  --  coffee,  cocoa,  sugar,  beef,  grains,
metals,  and  oil  seeds. As  may  be observed  the  countries  with  relatively
diversified  export  structures,  including  important  proportions  of manufactured
goods  are  Brazil,  Mexico,  the  Philippines  and  Yugoslavia.  1/
This  concentration  in  production  and  export  of items  which  have  in
the 1980s  been  subject  to remarkable  price  declines  has contributed  to the
recent  factors  in the  longer  term  or chronic  situation. However,  high  product
concentration  is  not  bad  in itself  nor  can  we say  absolutely  that
diversification  is  necessary  because  of  a long-term  decline  in the  terms  of
trade  of the  HICs. On the  one  hand,  it  is  possible  to formulate  market-
oriented  policies  to  cope  with  price  fluctuations.  On the  other,  new  evidence
suggests  that  too  much  has  been  made  of the  perceived  long-term  decline  in the
terms  of trade  of the  developing  countries. Revisiting  the  Prebisch-Singer
argument  with  new long-term  price  data,  Grilli  and  Yang (1988)  in  a recent
article  confirm  the  trend  identified  in  the  work  of Prebisch  but  not  the
magnitude  of the  decline,  and  even the  more limited  secular  decline  that  they
id:ntify  may  be  magnified  by  an incomplete  account  of quality  improvements  in
manufactures.  They  note  that  the  decline  in the  net  barter  Cerms  of trade  of
developing  countries  since  the  mid-1940s  seems  to  have  been  more  than
compensated  by the  steady  improvement  in  their  terms  of trade.
1/ We  have  also  examined  changes  in  concentration  across  time  using  the
Hirschmann  index  of concentration.  (Detailed  results  are  available  on
request). From 1970  to 1983,  some  reductions  in concentration  were
achieved  by Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Peru,  the  Philippines
and  Uruguay. Only  Mexico  and  Nigeria  experienced  major  increases  in the
concentration  of their  exports  --  no  doubt  due  to the  growth  in  the
importance  of  petroleum  exports.- 33  -
VI.  Final  Remarks
Improvements  in  resource  allocation  of both the  creditor  and  debtor
countries  play  a crucial  role  in  alleviating  the  debt  problem. This  paper  has
focused  attention  on one  of the  policy  areas  that  determines  the  allocation  of
resources,  namely,  trade  policies.
We emphasize  two  findings. In  the  first  place,  despite  continuing
balance  of payments  problems,  the  general  trend  among  the  HICs  is towards  the
reform  of their  economic  structure  in  an attempt  to  make  their  economies  more
efficient. In this  regard,  we show  evidence  that  in  recent  years  they  have
introduced  significant  trade  liberalization  measures. We believe  that  the
high  growth  of their  manufactured  exports  which  some  of the  HICs  have  achieved
owes  much  to the  reduction  of the  anti-export  bias in  their  trade  regimes,
coupled  with  the  adoption  of realistic  real  exchange  rates.
Unfortunately,  we also  show  evidence  of increasing  trade  restrictions
introduced  by the  creditor  countries  of the  HICs,  especially  in the  EC and  the
United  States. For  example,  during  the  80s,  we show  evidence  of increasing
use  of hard-core  NTBs. Creditor  countries  have  also  been  increasing  the
number  of unfair  trade  cases,  including  countervailing  and  antidumping
investigations  against  the  HICs. While  this  has  not  halted  the  growth  of
manufactured  exports  from  the  HICs,  it  has  certainly  reduced  the  trade
opportunities  and  has  added  to  the  allocative  inefficiencies  forced  on the
HICs  from  the  outside.
From  an economic  point  of  view,  the  trade-policy  behavior  of the
creditor  countries  cannot  be rationalized.  These  policies  are  worsening  the
allocation  of  resources  of these  economies,  and in  addition,  tend  to  worsen
the  already  poor  prospects  of the  debt  problem  and  therefore  of these
countries'  financial  sectors. There  is  a need  for  greater  coherence  between
their  policies  in  the  trade  and  financial  fields.- 34 -
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Annex  Table  1: APPLIED  1983  TARIFF  RATES  IN  EEC,  JAPAN  AND  USA  AGAINST
HICs  AND  OTHER  INOUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES  AGAINST  KEY  EXPORTS  OF  HICs
AND WHERE  RATE  AGAINST  HICs  EXCEED  5  PERCENT  IN  ONE  OF THE  MARKETS
EEC  Japan  USA
SITC3  Product  description  HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.
All  products  2.5  3.2  4.0  4.4  2.3  3.5
112 Alcoholic  beverages  22.2  7.3  50.5  46.0  3.5  5.2
684  Aluminum  5.2  1.3  6.1  7.1  0.3  1.7
642  Articles  of paper  etc.  5.7  5.7  1.8  3.9  5.3  4.4
893  Articles  of  plastic  NES  7.1  4,5  3.7  9.1  1.7  5.9
662  Clay,refractory  bidg  prd  7.7  4.6  2.4  4.6  7.6  9.7
841  Clothing  not  of fur  4.9  2.1  7.4  14.4  22.0  18.4
071  Coffee  9.3  18.0  18.6  8.1  0.0  0.0
652  Cotton  fabrics,woven  9.3  2.5  5.7  6.0  8.8  14.4
292  Crude  veg  materials  NES  6.8  6.9  0.2  0,9  0.6  1.8
052  Dried  fruit  11.3  9.3  30.5  4.1  0.1  4.4
729 Electrical  machinery  NES  6.7  7.3  1.7  4.5  6.0  5.5
723 Electr  distributing  mach  5.5  4.2  3.1  7.1  5.0  6.0
032  Fish  etc  tinned,prepared  17.0  9.8  10.0  11.3  0.3  1.0
031  Fish  fresh,simply  presvd  7.6  5.4  5.0  6.1  0.6  1.0
422 Fixed  veg  oil nonsoft  6.7  9.9  8.2  8.1  1.6  4.5
421 Fixed  veg  oils,soft  2.0  3.0  15.6  15.6  6.5  3.9
657  Floor  covr,tapestry  etc.  10.6  3.3  8.2  11.9  6.7  8.4
099  Food  preparations  NES  14.6  10.9  13.7  19.5  1.3  7.3
851  Footwear  6.2  0.7  8.8  22.8  10.3  9.4
053  Fruit  preserved,prepared  17.3  18.3  27.1  19.8  29.7  3.7
051  Fruit  frsh  nuts  frsh  dry  8.7  5.5  23.8  15.1  7.5  0.2
842 Fur  etc.  clothes,prod  4.7  2.1  12.7  20.0  3.0  6.6
861  Instruments,apparatus  4.4  6.7  1.1  4.6  5.2  5.5
674  Iron,stl  univ,plate,sheet  3.9  1.6  2.0  3.1  6.5  6.1
678  Iron,stl  pipes,  tubes  etc.  5.9  1.9  2.1  5.5  3.3  5.6
672  Iron,stl  primary  forms  3.3  1.1  2.0  3.8  5.7  6.1
675  Iron,steel  hoop,strip  4.4  0.8  2.0  4.9  6.9  6.8
611  Leather  3.8  1.8  5.5  14.1  2.6  5.0
612  Leather  etc.  manufactures  3.5  0.6  24.7  8.3  1.6  4.3
001  Live  animals  5.6  0.6  0.0  4.1  1.4  0.8
044  Maize  unmilled  0.0  0.0  5.6  5.2  0.1  0.5
013  Meat  tinned  NES  or  prepd  20.7  20.4  15.0  23.0  2,0  2.3
011 Meat  fresh,chilid,frozen  8.5  12.9  0.5  18.0  0.2  1.7
012 Meat  dried,salted,smoked  21.5  23.9  NA  17.0  4.0  2.2
541 Medicinal  etc.  products  5.1  2.5  2.4  4.5  1.3  6.1
512 Organic  chemicals  3.9  4.2  14.7  6.8  2.4  7.6
641 Paper  and  Paperboard  6.2  2.2  2.6  5.8  1.8  0.4
581 Plastic  materials  etc.  8.5  5.6  4.1  6.8  0.1  6.5
812 Plumbg,heating,lghtng  equ  4.8  0.9  2.0  5.3  9.9  9.0
732 Road  motor  vehicles  6.7  6.1  0.1  0.2  2.7  2.6
655  Special  textile  etc.  prod  7.3  3.8  2.7  5.0  1.1  12.9
061 Sugar  and  honey  25.7  27.0  93.7  16.8  10.8  11.9- 37  -
EEC  Japan  USA
SITC3  product  description  HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.
266  Synthetic,regenrtd  fibre  5.2  2.0  0.2  8.2  3.6  4.3
724 Telecommunications  equip  5.8  6.5  1.6  4.1  5.5  6.0
651  Textile  yarn  and  thread  4.4  2.3  4.3  7.7  10.3  10.5
656  Textile  etc  products  NES  10.1  1.2  5.1  9.1  11.8  12.9
122 Tobacco  mfrs  42.4  66.1  9.3  83.5  10.8  12.5
894  Toys,sporting  goods,etc  6.5  4.8  2.5  5.3  3.6  6.3
831  Travel  goods,handbags  4.7  3.3  7.2  12.3  9.2  8.9
054  Veg  etc frsh,smply  prsvd  8.1  6.6  5.8  8.4  7.8  5.2
055  Vegtbles  etc  prsvd,prepd  15.0  12.1  17.2  19.7  8.4  9.6
631  Veneers,plywood,etc  5.9  3.6  8.4  0.4  2.4  3.5
864  Watches  and  clocks  4.4  2.4  2.6  0.5  13.1  11.3
653  Woven  Textiles  noncotton  8.4  5.4  8.9  10.6  20.6  19.1
Note: NA Implies  no  trade,  which  may be  related  to  the  presence  of trade
barriers.
The  data  use  scheduled  tariff  rates,  which,  in  the  case  of many  agricul-
tural  products  (e.g.,  sugar),  are  often  subject  to  additional  measures,
such  as  variable  levies,  that  are  collected  as  duties. These  are  not
taken  into  account  in  the  table.
Source: Computation  by  the authors.- 38 -
Annex  Table  2:  HARD-CORE  NTBs  IN  EEC,  JAPAN  &  USA  AGAINST  KEY  EXPORTS  OF HICs,  1986
All  3-digit  SITC  Items  where  imports  by  EEC,  Japan  and  USA  combined  from  all  HICs  exceeds  $10
million  and  where  the  percentage  of trade  affected  by  NTBs  in  any  one  market  exceeds  5%
Percentage  of  Trade  Affected  by  NTBS
Against  HICS  &  Against  Industrial
SITC  PRODUCT  DESCRIPTION  EEC  Japan  USA
HICs  Ind.  HlCs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.
All  Products  18.1  11.5  9.6  28.9  4.2  13.2
All  except  petroleum  16.1  12.6  12.9  27.0  8.2  15.3
734  Aircraft  6.2  1.5  100.0  71.6  0.0  0.0
112 Alcoholic  beverages  33.4  19.6  14.6  75.C  0.0  0.0
081  Animal  feeding  stuff  3.2  42.7  10.4  19.2  0.0  2.8
411  Animal  oils  and  fats  0.0  10.7  93.8  6.6  0.0  0.0
045  Cereals  NES unmilled  100.0 100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
048  Cereal  ETC.  p,-eparations  97.3  8.7  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
024  Cheese  and  curd  100.0 100.0  100.0  64.1  98.8  88.9
599 Chemicals  NES  1.5  4.5  17.0  7.9  0.0  0.0
073  Chocolate  and  products  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  29.8  23.9
662  Clay,  Refractory  Bldg  prd  3.2  10.1  99.9  95.2  0.0  0.0
841  Clothing  not  of fur  84.7  9.7  0.0  0.0  14.8  2.6
321  Coal,  coke,  briquettes  30.0  20.1  0.0  99,q  0.0  0.0
072  Cocoa  28.2  29.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
652  Cotton  'abrics,  woven  84.5  0.8  100.0  66.0  99.6  61.1
331  Crude  petroleum,  etc.  23.9  10.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
292  Crude  veg  materials  NES  19.4  50.0  77.3  17.6  0.0  0.0
291  Crude  animal  matter  NES  11.0  7.9  65.7  85.4  0.2  34.1
052  Dried  fruit  23.8  52.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
729  Electrical  machinery  NES  22.9  6.7  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0
723  Electr  distributing  mach  8.4  4.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
561 Fertilizers  manufactured  0.5  1.8  100.0 100.0  0.0  0.0
032  Fish  etc.  tinned,  prepared  35.9  0.2  100.0 100.0  0.0  0.0
031  Fish  fresh,  simply  presvd  0.0  0.2  100.0 100.0  0.0  0.0
421  Fixed  veg  oils,  soft  97.6  100.0  0.0  NA  0.0  0.0
657  Floor  cover,  tapestry  etc.  4.6  5.8  0.0  0.0  87.7  16.6
099  Food  preparations  NES  4.7  3.5  10.9  22.7  0.0  2.1
851  Footwear  5.8  5.1  12.0  19.3  0.0  0.0
053  Fruit  preserved,  prepared  7.9  33.9  70.2  32.9  0.1  0.0
051  Fruit  frsh  nuts  frsh  dry  20.8  19.3  0.0  21.3  0.0  0.0
842  Fur  etc.  clothes,  prod  0.0  0.r  100.0  99.8  07  0.3
613  Fur  skins  tanned,  dressed  0.0  0.0  100.0 100.0  0.0  0.0
678  Irn,  stl pipes,  tubes  etc.  33.6  9.2  0.0  0.0  98.5  81.6
674  Irn,  sti  univ,  plate,  sheet  62.8  79.8  0.0  0.0  90.7  66.6
677  Irn,  sti  wire  exci  w rod  87.1  14.2  0.0  0.0  97.4  71.7
675  Iron,  steel  hoop,  strip  1.8  26.1  0.0  0.0  99.0  86.0
672  Iron,  sti  primary  forms  30.6  86.6  0.0  0.0  100.0  83.2
673  Iron  and  steel  shapes  39.1  67.5  0.0  0.0  89.9  79.9
611  Leather  20.0  18.8  50.7  74.5  0.0  0.0- 39  -
Percentage  of Trade Affected by NTBS
Against HICS  Against Industrial
SITC Product Description  EEC  Japan  USA
HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.  HICs  Ind.
001  Live animals  60.4  43.2  NA  3.5  0.0  0.0
718  Machs for spcl Industries  15.0  5.4  0.0  0.0.  0.0  0.0
044  Maize unmilled  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
011  Meat fresh,chilid,frozen  81.2  84.0  18.3  70.3  0.0  0.0
013  Meat tinned NES or prepd  91.2  92.7  84.1  97.4  0.0  0.0
012  Meat dried,salted,smoked  100.0  100.0  NA  100.0  0.0  0.0
541  Medicinal etc. products  0.0  0.0  56.1  45.0  0.0  0.0
714  Office  machines  14.9  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
221  Oil seeds, nuts, kernels  28.8  26.6  15.3  1.6  0.0  0.0
512  Organic chemicals  0.0  0.6  24.3  32.8  0.0  0.0
276  Other crude minerals  0.0  0.0  74.8  27.2  0.0  0.0
641  Paper and paperboard  29.9  7.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
671  Pig iron  etc.  35.6  17.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
581  Plastic materials etc.  22.7  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
666  Pottery  36.9  17.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
711  Fower machinery non-elec  49.1  2.4  0.6  38.2  0.0  0.0
042  Rice  100.0  100.0  NA  100.0  0.0  0.0
629  Rubber articles NES  29.7  7.3  0.0  14.5  0.0  0.0
735  Ships and boats  29.4  8.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
261  Silk  63.8  1.1  76.9  2.7  0.0  0.0
655  Special textile etc. prod  24.8  0.0  24.8  64.5  1.3  33.4
694  Stl, copper nails,nuts,etc  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  55.9  7.9
061  Sugar and honey  53.8  76.7  0.0  92.6  91.3  64.9
062  Sugar preps non-chocolate  97.1  17.3  98.3  86.5  0.0  0.0
266  Synthetic, regenrtd fibre  20.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
651  Textile yarn and thread  84.1  3.0  13.5  8.3  73.3  12.3
656  Textile etc. products NES  96.2  11.9  0.0  0.0  86.8  16.2
121  Tobacco unmfd  0.0  0.0  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0
286  Uranium, thorium ore, conc  0.0  0.0  12.6  24.4  0.0  0.0
055  Vegtbles etc. prsvd, prepd  24.4  43.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
864  Watches and clocks  3.6  29.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
693  Wire products NON electr  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  60.7  55.9
632  Wood manufactures NES  7.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
262  Wool and animal hair  37.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.1
653  Woven Textiles noncotton  73.8  1.4  73.7  86.3  30.2  4.3
686  Zinc  8.0  16.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Note:  NA shows the absence of trade, because of the presence of a  very
restrictive  NTB.
Only quantitative restrictions, VERs, WA  and variable levies  are
Included.
Source:  UNCTAD data base on trade measures.- 40
Annex  Table  3: US  COUNTERVAILING  DUTY  INVESTIGATIONS  INITIATED  AGAINST  HIGHLY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES,  1900-1986  1/
Country  1980  1901  1982  19f3  19J4  1985  1986  TOTAL
gontina  0  0  2  1  2  0  0  5
azil  0  1  12  5  4  2  3  27
11e  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1
Colombia  I  0  1  0  1  0  1  4
Costa  Rica  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  2
Ecuador  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1
Mexico  I  I  9  6  6  4  0  27
Peru  0  0  2  0  2  2  1  7
Philippines  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1
Uruguay  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  1
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  4  4  0  6
Yugoslavia  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1
Total  HICs  3  2  26  12  21  13  8  85
Total  LDCs  6  4  39  16  34  27  20  146
Total  CVD  Initiatioins  8  10  124  21  50  40  28  281
ICs  as  a  percent  of
LDCs  50  SO  67  75  62  33  29  5#
Total  CVDs  38  20  21  57  42  33  29  30
/  Bolivia,  Cote  d'ivoire,  Jmaica,  Morocco  and  Nigeria  have  not  been  affected  by  US  CVDs.
Source:  Trade  Action  Monitoring  System  (several  Issues).  See  also  Finger  and  Nogu6s,  1987.- 41  -
Annex  Table  4:  ANTIWMPING  CASES  AGAINST  HIGHLY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES,  1980-1986  1/
HIC  US  EEC  AUSTRALIA  CANADA  TOTAL
Argentina  5  2  0  2  9
Brazil  22  11  8  8  49
Chile  2  0  0  1  3
Colombia  4  0  0  0  4
Costa  Rica  1  0  0  0  1
Ecuador  1  0  0  0  1
Mexico  6  1  2  2  11
Peru  1  0  0  0  1
Philippines  1  0  4  0  5
Venezuela  11  3  0  0  14
Yugoslavia  4  21  3  1  29
Total  HiCs  58  38  17  14  12/
Total  LDCs  2/  141  84  133  54  412
Total  AD Initiation  346  280  416  230  1,272
HICs  as a percent  of
LDCs  41  45  13  26  31
Total  ADs  17  14  4  6  10
1/ BEolivia,  Cote  d'lvoire,  Jamaica,  Morocco,  Nigeria  and  Uruguay  have  not  been  affected
by  AD  duties.
2/  Includes:  Yugoslavia,  Greece,  Turkey  and  Portugal
Source: GATr  Files.Annex Table  5:  EXPORTS  OF  INDIVIOUAL  HiCs  TO WORLD,  1983
10 KEY 3-DIGIT  EXPORT  ITEMS TO WORLD
Exports  Share  %  Exports  Share
SITC  Product  Group  to World  (S)  in  SITC  Product  Group  to World  I%)  in
(5000)  Total  ($000)  Total
Argentina  Costs  Rice
WHEAT  ETC  UNMILLED  1474040  18 F-  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRV  372415  34.861
MAIZE  UNMILLED  803525  10 254  COFFEE  214062  20.038
ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  644337  8.223  CLOTHING  NOT  OF  FUR  73263  6.857
CEREALS  NES  UNMILLED  587809  7.toOl  MEAT  FRESH.CHILLD.FROZEN  40453  3.787
MHAI  FRESH.CHILLO.FROZEN  430083  5.4U9  SUGAR  AND HONEV  28348  2.654
FIXED  VEG  OILS.SOFT  429437  5.480  MEDICINAL  ETC  PRODUCTS  24912  2.332
OIL  SEEDS,NUTS.KERNELS  360885  4.605  ELEC  PWR MACH.SWITCHGEAR  21279  1.992
PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  325808  4  '58  CRUDE  VEG  MATERIALS  NES  18830  1.763
LEATHER  256300  3.271  FOOD  PREPARATIONS  NES  14777  1.383
SUGAR  AND  HONEY  204750  2.613  FISH  FRESH.SIMPLV  PRESVO  13855  1.297
801  vie  Cote  d'lvoire
GAS  NATURAL  AND MANUFCTD  385881  47.197  COCOA  524759  25.379
TIN  177813  21.74e  COFFEE  452368  21.878
NONFER  BASE  MTL ORE.CONC  103204  12.623  WOOD  ROUGH  196180  9.488
SILVER  AND  PLATINUM  ORES  58380  7.140  PETROLEUM  PROOUCTS  195672  9.463
CRUDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  29304  3.584  COTTON  82938  4.011
COFFFE  13066  1.598  wooD  SHAPED  68996  3.337
SUGAR  AND  HONEV  12427  1.520  FISH  ETC  TINNED.PREPARED  51958  2.513
NON-FER  BASE  METALS  NES  6290  0.769  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  ORV  49039  2.372
GOOD  SHAPED  5742  0.702  FIXED  VEG  OIL  NONSOFT  47053  2.276
PEIROLEUM  PRODUCTS  4888  0.598  CRUDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  38087  1.842
Brazil  Ecuador
COFFEE  2347396  10.720  CRUDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  1551535  69.712  r)
ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  1971902  9.005  COFFEE  170902  7.679  1
IRON  ORE.CONCENTRATES  1513010  6.909  FISH  FRESH.SIMPLY  PRESVD  154242  6.930
PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  1130219  5.161  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRV  145898  6.555
ROAD  MOTOR  VEHICLES  939159  4.289  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  92961  4.177
IRN.STL  UNIV.PLATE.SHEET  714948  3.265  COCOA  19315  0.868
'OOTWEAR  681364  3.112  CHOCOLATE  AND  PRODUCTS  16259  0.731
IRUI  PRESERVED.PREPARED  646773  2.954  FISH  ETC  TINNEDOPREPARED  14488  0.651
ORGA4IC  CHEMICALS  563577  2.574  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  11579  0.520
COCOA  556587  2.542  VEG  F!BRE.EXCL  COTN  JUTE  8481  0.381
C  *ile  Jamaica
COPPEP  1318395  36.424  NONFER  BASE  MTL  ORE.CONC  484754  64.032
NOW-FERROUS  METAL  SCRAP  330393  9.128  SUGAR  AND  HONEV  44589  5.890
iRON  ORE,CONCENTRATES  321427  8.880  ALCOHOLIC  BEVERAGES  39520  5.220
ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  321403  8.879  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  20329  2.685
FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  ORY  217231  6.001  CLOTHING  NOT OF  FUR  17974  2.374
PULL' AMD WASTE  PAPER  160561  4.436  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRY.  15760  2.082
NONFER  BASE  MTL  ORE.CONC  142469  3.936  TOBACCO  MFRS  9850  1.301
SILVER.PLATINUM.ETC  115424  3.189  VEG  ETC  FRSH.SMPLV  PRSVO  9291  1.227
FISH FRESH.SIMPLV  PRESVD  7166?  1.980  COFFEE  7174  0.948
WOOD  SHAPED  63245  1.747  MACHINES NES  NONELECTRIC  6045  0.798
Colombia  Mexico
COFFEE  1541445  50.032  CRUDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  14301093  54.570
PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  434968  14.118  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIP  1120317  4.275
FRUIf  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRY  150923  4.899  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  675483  2.578
CRUDE  VEC  MATERIALS  NES  122315  3.970  POWER  MACHINERY  NON-ELEC  609699  2.326
SUGAR  AND  HONEY  7%978  2.466  ELEC  PWR MACH.SW!TCHGEAR  548526  2.093
CtOTHING  NOT OF  FUR  62074  2.015  SILVER.PLATINUM.ETC  542437  2.070
PIG  IRON  ETC  47651  1.547  GAS  NATURAL  AND  MANUFCTO  535804  2.045
PEARL.PREC  .SEMI-P  STONE  35196  1.142  VEG  ETC  FRSH.SMPLV  PRSVO  519814  1.984
PRINTED  MATTER  33592  1.090  ROAD  MOTOR  VEHICLES  471225  1.798
CHLIMICALS  NES  32712  1.062  FISH FRESH.SIMPLY PRESVD  459727  1.754EXPORTS  SHARE  Exports  Share It  Product  Group  to  World  (%)  in  SITC  Product  Group  to World  (M)  in  COMBINED  nEY  EXPOR?  !TEMS  OF  HICS
($000)  Total  ($000)  Total  Exports
Mo°occo  Uruguay  SITC  k-od.ct  Group  (S'OOO)  7. FERTILIZERS.CRUDE  466555  22.626  MEAT  FRESH.CHILLD.FROZEN  241336  23.932  TOTAL  TRADE  ii6420262  100.000 CNORG  ELEMNTS.OXIDES.ETC  298027  14.453  WOOL  AND  ANIMAL  HAIR  171158  16.973  COTAE  PTRODEUMTC  6290267  310.000 FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRY  158247  7.674  RICE  73480  7.287  CRUDE  PET  ROLEUM.ETC  36298047  31.178 CLOTHING  NOT  OF  FUR  147280  7.  142  CLOTHING  NOT  OF  FUR  65774  6.522  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  4B58367  4.173 FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  128905  6.251  LEATHER  62538  6.202  COFFEA  EEDN485861  2.543 FISH  FRESH.SIMPLV  PRESVD  122623  5.947  FISH  FRESH.SIMPLV  PRESVD  39406  3.908  ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  2962907  2.545 VEG  ETC  FRSH,SMPLV  PRSVD  78778  3.820  LIVE  ANIMALS  30551  3.030  ROAD  MOTOR  VEHICLES  1834496  1.576 PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  75314  3.652  BUTTER  22317  2.213  IRON  ORECONCENTRATES  1834437  1.576 FISH  ETC  TINNED.PREPARED  69798  3.385  FUR  ETC  CLOTHES.PROD  21446  2.127  NONFER  BASE  MZL  ORE,CONC  1488513  1.279 NONFER  BASE  MTL  ORE.CONC  59282  2.875  WOVEN  TEXTILES  NONCOTTON  20504  2.033  COPPER  1474040  1.266
Nigeria  Venezuela  COCOA  1371936  1.178 ,RUDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  11725212  94.697  CRUDE  PETROLEUM,ETC  8455824  58.313  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRY  1350267  1.160 COCOA  271275  2.191  PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  5383003  37.122  FOOTWEAR  1204663  1.035 PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  132415  1.069  ALUMINIUM  330482  2.279  CLOTHING  NOT  OF FUR  1161948  0.99B 'IL  sEEDS.NUTS.KERNELS  24973  0.202  IRN.STL  UNIV.PLATE.SHEET  30469  0.210  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  EQUIP  1120317  0.962 RUBBER  CRJDE.SYNTHETIC  21565  0.174  FERTILIZERS  MANUFACTURED  2e761  0.198  MAIZE  UNMILLED  1012574  0.870 HIOES.SKINS.UNDRESSEO  17590  0.142  PIG  IRON  ETC  28302  0.195  FISH  FRESH.SIMPLY  PRESVD  943334  0.810 rIN  15421  0.125  FISH  FRESH.SIMPLY  PRESVD  23626  0.163  GAS  NATURAL  AND  MANUFCTO  921685  0.792 LEATHER  14627  0.118  FRUIT  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  ORY  22090  0.152  SILVER,PLATINUM.ETC  914401  0.785 FIXED  VEG  OIL  NONSOFT  14089  0.114  IRON  AND  STEEL  SHAPES  20899  0.144  ELEC  PWR  MACH.SWITCHGEAR  836082  0.718 ANIMAL  FEEDING  STUFF  13686  0.111  INORG  ELEMNTS.OXIDES,ETC  18796  0.130  IRN.STL  UNIV,PLATE.SFEET  745417  0.640 MEAT  FRESH.CHILLD.FROZEN  711872  0.611 Peru  Yugoslavia  SUGAR  AND  HONEY  682228  0.586  r NONFER  BASE  MTL  ORE.CONC  416766  20.740  MACHINES  NES  NONELECTRIC  570633  5.756  ALUMINIUM  664689  0.571  ' DETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  266968  13.285  FOOTWEAR  523299  5.279  FRUIT  PRESERVED.PREPARED  646773  0.556 SILVER.PLATINUM,ETC  256540  12.767  CLOTHING  NOT  OF FUR  477859  4.820  POWER  MACHINERV  NON-ELEC  609699  0.524 CRoDE  PETROLEUM.ETC  196992  9.803  ROAD  MOTOR  VEHICLES  424112  4.278  VFG  ETC  FRSH,SMPLV  PRSVO  607883  0.522 ZINC  113814  5.664  SHIPS  AND  BOATS  339027  3.420  'EREALS.NES  UNMILLED  587809  0.505 COFFEE  111954  5.571  ALUMINIUM  334207  3.371  FIXED  VEG  OIL  NONSOFT  577074  0.496 COPPER  101949  5.073  FURNITURE  317511  3.203  MACHINES  NES  NONELECTRIC  576678  0.495 FISH  FRESH.SIMPLY  PRESVD  58188  2.896  ELECTRI.AL  MACHINERV  NES  274547  2.769  ORGANIL  CHEMICALS  563577  0.404 rEXTILE  VARN  AND  THREAO  51180  2.547  ELEC  PWR  MACH.SWITCHGEAR  266277  2.686  FERTJICZERS,CRUHE  466555  0.401 COTTON  FABRICS.WOVEN  34462  1.715  MAIZE  UNMILLED  209049  2.109  ELECTFICAL MACHI  ER  NES  447560  0.384 FIXED  VEG  OILS,SOfT  429437  0.369
Philippines  OIL  SkEDS,NUTS,KERNELS  385858  0.331 FIXED  VEG  OIL  NONSOFT  515932  10.388  SHIPS  AND  BOATS  339027  0.291 CLOTHiNG  NOT  OF  FUR  317734  6.397  LEATHER  333465  0.286 'UGAR  AND  HONEV  316136  6.365  NON-FERROUS  METAL  SCRAP  330393  0.284 vd.NFER BASE  MTL  ORE,CONC  282038  5679  FUROI
T URE  317511  0.273 1  FRSH  NUTS  FRSH  DRY  218664  4.403  INORG  ELEMNTS,OXIDES.ETC  316823  0.272 t_tCTRICAL  MACHINERV  NES  173013  3.483  WOOD  SHAPED  287069  0.247 %I.VER  AND  PLATINUM  ORES  153594  3.092  SILVER  AND  PLATINUM  ORES  211974  0.182 wOOD  SHAPED  '49087  3.002  WOOD  ROUGH  196180  0.169 vENEERS.PLVWOOD.ETC  110628  2.227  TIN  193234  0.166 PETROLEUM  PRODUCTS  108314  2.181  WOOL  AND  ANIMAL  HAIR  171158  0.141
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